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QUEER SACRIFICE IN MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP 
 




This Article interprets the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 
as a critical extension of Derrick Bell’s interest convergence thesis 
into the LGBTQ movement.  Chiefly, Masterpiece reveals how the 
Court has been more willing to accommodate gay individuals who 
appear more assimilated and respectable—such as those who 
participated in the marriage equality decisions—than LGBTQ 
individuals who are less “mainstream” and whose exhibited 
queerness appear threatening to the heteronormative status quo.  
When assimilated same-sex couples sought marriage in Obergefell 
v. Hodges, their respectable personas facilitated the alignment 
between their interests to marry and the Court’s interest in 
affirming the primacy of marriage.  Masterpiece, however, 
demonstrates that when the litigants’ sexual identities seem less 
assimilated and more destabilizing to the status quo, the Court 
becomes much less inclined to protect them from discrimination 
and, in turn, reacts by reinforcing its interest to preserve the 
status quo—one that relies on religious freedoms to fortify 
heteronormativity.  To push this observation further, this Article 
explores how such failure of interest convergence in Masterpiece 
extends Derrick Bell’s thesis on involuntary racial sacrifice and 
fortuity into the LGBTQ context—arguing that essentially 
Masterpiece is an example of queer sacrifice.  Thus, using the 
appositeness of critical race thinking, this Article regards the 
reversal in Masterpiece as part of the contours of interest 
convergence, queer sacrifice, and fortuity in the LGBTQ 
movement.  Such observations ultimately prompt this Article to 
propose specific liberationist strategies that the movement ought 
to adopt in forging ahead. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite equality in marriage for same-sex couples, the 
Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission1 illustrates that the dominant 
status quo is still able to pick and choose which moments to 
discriminate against sexual minorities.  This Article will show 
how the impasse from fully reaching sexual orientation 
antidiscrimination in Masterpiece is associated with the choices 
                                                 
1 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
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that the gay movement has made with the visibility of sexual 
minorities, particularly from the Court’s prior marriage cases.  
Marriage equality is not true equality.  Marriage equality 
litigation purposely depicted same-sex couples as assimilated and 
distinctively aligned with the dominant status quo in order to 
increase the viability that the Court would extend marriage 
rights.2  In writing about Obergefell, others have noted that 
eventual success was premised on this carefully-crafted image of 
sameness, assimilation, and respectability because it allowed the 
interests of same-sex couples in seeking marriage rights to 
converge with the Court’s interests in affirming the 
heteronormative institution of marriage.3  Indeed, through such 
an interpretation of Obergefell, some have borrowed Derrick Bell’s 
well-regarded interest convergence thesis from critical race 
theory and applied it to explain how the Court reached its 
decision to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples.4   
In examining Masterpiece, this Article affirms and then 
extends further such application of Bell’s thesis.  It explores 
Masterpiece as an example where interests failed to converge and 
what that failure signifies.  Deviating from its high regard for 
assimilated same-sex couples in Obergefell, the Masterpiece Court 
was unwilling to accommodate the less assimilated, less 
seemingly-respectable queer identities of the same-sex couple 
involved.  Instead, their queerness led the Court to reinforce 
interests in preserving the status quo—one that currently 
protects religious exercise over the rights of sexual minorities.  In 
this way, the Article will render further analogies to Derrick 
Bell’s racial justice theorizing—not only to his interest 
convergence thesis but also his later theories on involuntary 
racial sacrifice and fortuity—to explain how Masterpiece speaks 
profoundly about the current progress of LGBTQ rights in the 
post-marriage equality era.  Applying Bell’s theory of involuntary 
racial sacrifice, Masterpiece is ultimately a grave example of 
                                                 
2 See generally Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs, 125 Yale L.J. F. 136 (2015). 
3 Yuvraj Joshi, The Respectable Dignity of Obergefell v. Hodges, 6 Cal. L. Rev. 
Circuit 117, 122-24 (2015) [hereinafter Joshi, Respectable Dignity]; Neo Khuu, 
Obergefell v. Hodges: Kinship Formation, Interest Convergence, and the Future 
of LGBTQ Rights, 64 UCLA L. Rev. 184, 214-224 (2017). 
4 Id. 
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queer sacrifice.  Nevertheless, the Article will also use Bell’s 
theorizing to show invariably how sexual minorities ought to 
forge ahead.    
Beyond this Introduction, Part II explores assimilationist 
strategies in both the gay movement and the marriage equality 
sub-movement that culminated in the proliferation of sameness 
and respectability archetypes that helped leverage marriage 
equality.  Part III first compares the assimilative characteristics 
of the same-sex couples from Obergefell against the queer 
sexualities of the Masterpiece couple.  Then Part III examines 
Masterpiece to show how the decision is an example of queer 
sacrifice and what this sacrifice indicates for LGBTQ equality 
going forward.  Finally, before Part V’s conclusion, Part IV uses 
guidance from Bell’s forged fortuity theory for solutions in the 
movement’s next steps beyond Masterpiece.  
II.  ASSIMILATIONIST STRATEGIES IN MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
A.  ASSIMILATION VERSUS LIBERATION - HISTORICAL TENSIONS 
Questions of strategy have always embroiled themselves 
centrally in the social and political advancements of sexual 
minorities.  Even in earlier mid-20th century efforts, various 
incarnations of the American LGBTQ movement have pondered 
and taken sides between embracing assimilationist strategies, 
which insist on a rights-based perspective within the existing 
liberal democratic regime, and liberationist strategies, which 
assert change from a more revolutionary perspective outside the 
dominant political discourse.5  This basic tug-of-war between 
strategies famously ripped through the Mattachine Society, an 
early gay rights group that dominated over the homophile 
movement of the 1950s—a precursor movement of the 
contemporary LGBTQ crusade.6  Initially, the Mattachine Society 
embraced liberationist values and led the homophile movement 
by organizing a militant following, igniting participant self-
                                                 
5 CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS: THE GAY AND LESBIAN 
MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2002) [hereinafter RIMMERMAN, FROM 
IDENTITY TO POLITICS].  
6 Id. at 21-22. 
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awareness as an active minority group, and dedicating efforts 
toward legal advancements and changes in public perceptions 
against sexual minorities.7  Within the McCarthy Era, 
liberationist strategies and ideologies, which embodied 
communist principles, eventually led to conflict within the 
Mattachine Society, especially when “rank-and-file Mattachine 
members grew increasingly concerned with the organization’s 
possible association with communism.”8  In the disagreement 
between founding Mattachine leaders and its membership, the 
central conflict between assimilation and liberation arose as 
“[t]he Mattachine founders envisioned a separate homosexual 
culture while other members worried that such a strategy would 
only increase the hostile social climate.”9  Unlike their 
liberationist-entrenched leadership, the society’s newer members 
“called for integration into mainstream society” and that conflict 
led to change at the helms of the Mattachine in 1953.10   
Such change ultimately resulted in the homophile 
movement’s abandonment of liberationist approaches for 
assimilationist ones.11  From the mid-1950s, this re-vamped 
homophile movement focused on initiating dialogue with 
mainstream society by presenting sexual minorities as upright 
citizens in order to change public perceptions of homosexuality.12  
Specifically, “[t]heir strategy was to present themselves as 
reasonable, well-adjusted people, hoping that these heterosexual 
arbiters of public opinion would rethink their assumptions 
regarding homosexuality.”13  Unlike earlier tactics, the activists’ 
strategy now promoted sameness between the heterosexual 
mainstream and sexual minorities:  “This approach, rooted in 
dialogue, emphasized conformity and attempted to minimize any 
differences between heterosexuality and homosexuality.”14  That 
approach prevailed until the time of Stonewall in 1969.15   
                                                 
7 Id. at 20-21.  
8 Id.  
9 Id. at 21. 
10 Id.  
11 Id. 
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After Stonewall, liberationist strategies gained more 
traction as gay and lesbian activism of the late 1960s transitioned 
to reflect the radical politics of the 1970s.16  Assimilationist 
strategies took a back-seat as the goal of many gay activists at 
the time was to revolutionize society and not merely change 
mainstream perceptions.17  During this time, the work of the Gay 
Liberation Front came to the forefront of the gay rights 
movement by challenging status quo.18  One of its noted works 
involved mainstream representations of sexual minorities 
through language and cultural imagery.  Known as “visibility 
rhetoric,” its use of language was important and essential for 
achieving the social group identity of gays and lesbians.19  For 
instance, the word “homosexual” was replaced with “gay,” and the 
consciousness of the group was reinforced with the word “pride.”20   
But as activism for sexual minorities entered the 1980s and 
organizations within the movement began to play active roles in 
national politics—particularly as the AIDS crisis and the 
conservative Republican rise in the mainstream political sphere 
prompted the urgency for national presence—assimilationist 
strategies began to return to tactical prominence.21  Preference 
for assimilationist strategies deepened as marriage litigation in 
the early 1990s directed the gay movement toward marriage 
equality.22  In litigating and changing public reactions to same-
sex marriages, activists shifted perceptions by crafting arguments 
for “sameness” between same-sex and opposite-sex relationships 
and by arguing for the human universality of being23—arguments 
                                                 
16 Id. at 23. 
17 Id. at 24. 
18 Id. 
19 Jacobs, supra n. __, at 725-26. 
20 RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS, supra n. __, at 24.  
21 Id. at 28-29. 
22 Carlos A. Ball, Introduction: The Past and the Future, in AFTER MARRIAGE 
EQUALITY: THE FUTURE OF LGBT RIGHTS 3 (Carlos A. Ball ed., 2016). 
23 Id.; see also CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENTS: 
ASSIMILATION OR LIBERATION? 147 (2008) [hereinafter RIMMERMAN, THE 
LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENTS]. 
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that the homophile movement’s assimilationist strategies had 
tried to instill a generation before.24   
B.  MARRIAGE AS ASSIMILATIONIST STRATEGY 
When it comes to marriage, the movement’s attachment to 
that idea has had a lengthy history and is nothing if not complex.  
As Carlos Ball recounts, “[t]he question of marriage has been the 
subject of discussion and activism from the beginning of the 
LGBT rights movement in the United States.”25  Although 
deprived of the right to marry in the twentieth century, some 
accounts exists of same-sex couples taking part in symbolic 
marriage ceremonies over the decades prior to actualizing legal 
recognition of same-sex marriages.26  Then legal action took  
shape.  In the 1970s, same-sex couples in several states across the 
U.S. also initiated lawsuits to obtain the right to marry.27  At that 
time, during the liberationist heyday, the underlying purpose of 
these lawsuits focused more on the legal participation that 
marriage would afford sexual minorities rather than any 
integrationist notions of becoming part of the mainstream.28  
Exclusion from marriage meant that the rights and incidents of 
marriage enjoyed by wedded opposite-sex couples eluded same-
sex couples.29  Such desire for equal treatment was often the 
actual goal of these early same-sex marriage suits, rather than 
folding sexual minorities into the social fabric.30  Unfortunately, 
none of the same-sex couples who sued for the right to marry ever 
prevailed in these early efforts—including Baker v. Nelson, which 
was denied certiorari review by the Supreme Court.31                            
                                                 
24 Elizabeth J. Baia, Akin to Madmen: A Queer Critique of the Gay Rights 
Cases, 104 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1027-28 (2018). 
25 Ball, supra n. __, at 1. 
26 Id.  
27 E.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1974); Jones v. 
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 
185 (Minn. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
28 Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When Gay Marriage Was Radical, 27 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 38-41 (2015) [hereinafter Boucai, Glorious Precedents].   
29 RIMMERMAN, THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENTS, supra n. __, at 139-40.  
30 Boucai, Glorious Precedents, supra n. __, at 4. 
31 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
8         QUEER SACRIFICE                         [Vol. __ 
 
 
Forthcoming, to be published in the Yale Journal of Law & Feminism. 
Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission. 
Notwithstanding feminist critiques of marriage as a 
patriarchal institution, gay rights thinkers also exhibited 
apprehension toward marriage.  The now-classic 1989 debate 
between Paula Ettelbrick and Tom Stoddard published in 
Out/Look Magazine exposes the assimilationist-versus-
liberationist tensions that activism and ultimately obtaining the 
right to marry would bring.32  Ettelbrick and Stoddard were both 
colleagues at the Lambda Legal Defense Fund, but shared 
profound differences on the idea of same-sex marriage.33  
Ettelbrick held views against same-sex marriage while Stoddard 
possessed favorable ones.34  Their debate illustrated quite 
succinctly but effectively some of the fundamental assimilationist-
versus-liberationist perspectives on same-sex marriage. 
Though not completely agreeable with the institution of 
marriage, Stoddard took the position “that every lesbian and gay 
man should have the right to marry the same-sex partner of his 
or her choice, and that the gay rights movement should 
aggressively seek full legal recognition for same-sex marriages.”35  
He then underscored his strong belief through practical, political, 
and philosophical explanations that all more-or-less illustrate 
how marriage would uphold and integrate same-sex couples 
within mainstream society.36   
 But from the liberationist view, Ettelbrick articulated her 
anti-marriage stance by criticizing the importance of “self-
affirmation” that many gay couples ideally seek through 
marriage.37  She understood the appeal:  “After all, those who 
marry can be instantaneously transformed from ‘outsiders’ to 
                                                 
32 Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, 
OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at 8, 9, 14-17 ; Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People 
Should Seek the Right to Marry, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at 8, 8-13. 
33 David W. Dunlap, Paula L. Ettelbrick, Legal Expert in Gay Rights Movement, 




35 Stoddard, supra n. ___, at 10. 
36 Id. 
37 Ettelbrick, supra n. ___, at 9. 
2019]                           QUEER SACRIFICE                                    9 
 
 
Forthcoming, to be published in the Yale Journal of Law & Feminism. 
Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission. 
‘insiders,’ and we have a desperate need to become insiders.”38  
That desire might be tantalizing to sexual minorities for various 
symbolic and dignifying reasons, but Ettelbrick argued that 
obtaining marriage would, firstly, force assimilation upon sexual 
minorities rather than liberate them, and, secondly, minimize the 
plurality of queer identities that preclude justice for sexual 
minorities.39  Rather, Ettelbrick argued that “[j]ustice for gay 
men and lesbians will only be achieved when we are accepted and 
supported in this society despite our differences from the 
dominant culture and the choices we make regarding our 
relationships.”40  Marriage would be antithetical to her view of 
equality that did not emphasize “sameness” but rather stressed 
acceptance and equal treatment of plurality.41  “The law,” she 
wrote, “provides us no room to argue that we are different, but 
are nonetheless entitled to equal protection.”42  Ultimately, in 
marriage activism, Ettelbrick saw the rights-based approach by 
assimilationists as resulting in inauthenticity:  “We end up 
mimicking all that is bad about an institution of marriage in our 
effort to appear to be the same as straight couples.”43  That 
inauthenticity would accommodate the inequalities within gay 
culture and society as well:   
Of course, a white man who marries another white 
man who has a full-time job with benefits will 
certainly be able to share in those benefits and 
overcome the only obstacle left to full societal 
assimilation—the goal of many in his class.  In other 
words, gay marriage will not topple the system that 
allows only the privileged few to obtain decent 
health care. Nor will it close the privilege gap 
between those who are married and those who are 
not.44 
                                                 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 10, 14. 
40 Id. at 14. 
41 Id. at 15. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 16. 
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Prophetically, Ettelbrick also predicted the decline in gay political 
advancement once marriage is obtained:  “If the laws change 
tomorrow and lesbians and gay men were allowed to marry, 
where would we find the incentive to continue the progressive 
movement we have started that is pushing for societal and legal 
recognition of all kinds of family relationships?”45  All in all, her 
reasons against pursuing marriage were predominantly pointed 
at how it would subordinate sexual minorities underneath a 
multidimensional, white heteronormative supremacy both 
externally and within the movement.   
In pre-Obergefell 1989, the Stoddard-Ettelbrick pro-and-
con debate in Out/Look Magazine illuminated profound 
complications that the idea of marriage underscored between 
assimilationist and liberationist strategies for the movement as a 
whole.  But in light of any efforts to resist conformity and 
assimilation, marriage equality activism began to advance shortly 
around the time the Stoddard-Ettelbrick debate was published.46  
Despite latency for more than a decade, interest in advancing 
same-sex marriage came about consequentially from the impact 
that the AIDS epidemic pressed upon inheritance and death 
benefits issues of sexual minorities.47  In 1989, the State Bar 
Association of California recommended legally recognizing same-
sex marriages.48  Then in the early 1990s, marriage litigation 
that began in Hawaii eventually led to the temporary success of 
Baehr v. Lewin,49 where the Hawaii Supreme Court recognized 
that denying same-sex couples the right to marry could be 
unconstitutional.50  The surprise success of Baehr, however slight, 
brought frenzy to both social conservatives and gay rights 
proponents.51  According to Carlos Ball, post-Baehr “a growing 
number of LGBT rights organizations, facing both the surprising 
                                                 
45 Id. at 17. 
46 See, e.g., Philip S. Gutis, Ideas and Trends: Small Steps Toward Acceptance 





49 852 P.2d 44 (1993). 
50 Id. at 68. 
51 Ball, supra n. __, at 3. 
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prospect of a possible victory in the Hawai’i courts and a growing 
conservative backlash against marital rights for same-sex 
couples, quickly turned the pursuit of marriage equality into their 
most important objective.”52   
Though the marriage equality movement held possibilities 
for articulating gay rights through a more universalized frame53 
and its focus on same-sex couples pushed the discussion over 
sexual orientation discrimination into a different realm,54 a 
substantial formulation for demanding equality in marriage 
hinged on assimilationist arguments based on sameness:  
Through the process of demanding admission into 
the institution of marriage, the movement sought to 
establish that LGBT individuals were capable of 
entering and remaining in committed 
relationships—and, for those who had them, of 
raising children—in ways that did not differ 
fundamentally from the experiences of 
heterosexuals.55   
Such sameness arguments eventually prevailed to facilitate 
certain sub-group’s desires for disparate results for other sub-
groups in the LGBTQ movement:   
Although some feminist and queer activists 
continued to criticize the embrace of marriage as an 
assimilationist and conservative move that would 
not help individuals who were not interested in, or 
would not benefit financially from, marriage, those 
voices were largely drowned out as many movement 
organizations, as well as an apparent majority of 
LGBT individuals, made marriage equality their top 
political priority.”56   
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 Janet R. Jakobsen, Queer Relations: A Reading of Martha Nussbaum on 
Same-Sex Marriage, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 133, 137 (2010).  
54 Ball, supra n. __, at 3. 
55 Id. 
56 Id.  
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As Ettelbrick predicted, the drive toward marriage equality was 
eventually fueled by a prevalent class within the LGBTQ 
movement at the cost of intra-group marginalization.     
C.  ASSIMILATIONIST STRATEGIES AND INTEREST CONVERGENCE 
While Obergefell was being heard at the Supreme Court—
just a little more than two decades after Baehr—the effects of 
assimilationist strategies in the marriage equality and gay rights 
movements had continued to crystallize.  Ettelbrick’s noted 
disparity had, indeed, persisted.  Mere months before the 
Obergefell decision, Alexander Nourafshan and Angela Onwuachi-
Willig echoed what other scholars had articulated—that successes 
in gay rights advancement in pursuing marriage had incurred an 
unfortunate cost to the movement itself.57   
According to Nourafshan and Onwuachi-Willig, in 
championing marriage, movement proponents had, historically 
throughout the struggle up to Obergefell, embraced 
assimilationist tactics over liberationist ones:  “[R]ather than seek 
to disrupt the paradigm of heteronormativity, assimilation-
oriented homosexuals sought to fit gay rights into the existing 
legal and social structure, without threatening to upend the social 
order.”58  The consequences might have made some in-roads 
toward formal equality, but the progress retained—if not 
deepened—some substantial limits for the movement as a whole:   
Although Windsor and the revolution of cases that 
have led to Obergefell [sic] hold significant promise 
for one privileged subset of gays and lesbians—
white, economically privileged, and educated gays 
and lesbians—they do not necessarily carry the same 
potential for less privileged subgroups within the 
gay and lesbian community, namely gays and 
lesbians of color.59   
                                                 
57 Alexander Nourafshan & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, From Outsider to Insider 
and Outsider Again: Interest Convergence and the Normalization of LGBT 
Identity, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 521 (2015). 
58 Id. at 526 (citations omitted). 
59 Id. at 521-22. 
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Others have similarly discerned, before and since Obergefell, that 
the assimilative push for equality in marriage was ironically done 
through channeling some important disparities within the gay 
community and movement.  According to Kathrine Franke, “[i]n 
the marriage cases, lesbians and gay men have accomplished a 
rebranding of what it means to be homosexual.”60  Through what 
she calls “just like us” arguments that connote sameness to the 
mainstream,61 that sameness connotation has eventually led to 
the prevailing use of whiteness in marriage litigation’s 
rebranding of the gay identity.62  Consequently, she posits that 
marriage became “publicly perceived to be a white issue” and the 
marriage equality movement itself “specifically enjoy a kind of 
racial privilege that has underwritten the plausibility of this 
positive transformation in the meaning of gay identity.”63  Even 
before the 2003 success in Massachusetts through Goodridge, 
Darren Lenard Hutchinson had referenced what some scholars on 
race were already saying about the same-sex marriage movement 
in the U.S.—the apprehension “that many (or most) of the 
benefits from same-sex marriage will accrue to white and upper-
class individuals.”64   
Nourafshan and Onwuachi-Willig also contend that the 
assimilationist strategies in marriage equality became a vehicle 
for a dominant sexual minority group—one that projected a 
white, upper-middle class image to emerge with its interests 
(including marriage) as representative of the rest of the sexual 
minority population.65  They direct their findings at the sameness 
arguments.66  Although the movement obtained some progress on 
social issues such as marriage, the collateral result is that “[t]he 
movement’s portrayal of gay identity as white, wealthy, and 
educated has created a race-based insider identity for white 
                                                 
60 Katherine Franke, What Marriage Equality Teaches Us: The Afterlife of 
Racism and Homophobia, in Ball, supra n. __, at 247. 
61 Id. at 249-50.  
62 Id. at 250. 
63 Id. at 251. 
64 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites" ?: Race, Sexual 
Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1370 
(2000)  
65 Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra n. __, at 522. 
66 Id. at 526. 
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homosexuals in mainstream society and within the gay 
community.”67  In other words, “[t]he construction of gay identity 
has rendered whiteness the racial default, implicitly privileging 
white homosexuals over gays of color.”68  Rebranding has become 
reality. 
The saliency of this result is itself not hard to perceive.  
Indeed, even in 1989 before the advancement of marriage 
equality, Ettelbrick had predicted the racial and economic 
subordination of sexual minorities through obtaining the right to 
marry.  Borrowing from Derrick Bell’s racial justice theorizing, 
his interest convergence theory helps illuminate the correlation 
between assimilationist strategies in the marriage movement and 
marginalizing effects on sexual minorities.69  In theorizing racial 
inequality, Bell posited that the recognition of legal rights of 
those subordinated only occur upon convincing the white 
decisionmakers that the interests of both groups converge.70  At 
the start of the marriage movement, sexual minorities vying for 
the right to marry appeared as outsiders attempting to appease 
the heterosexual mainstream who have the ability to marry and 
the power to extend the right to marry.  Proponents and 
movement activists abandoned liberationist, outsider rhetoric to 
reach for sameness arguments, which revised pronouncements 
that same-sex couples could love, have relationships, or rear 
children well enough to deserve the rights and benefits of 
marriage to be “just like you.”  Assimilationist accounts of 
sameness were predicated on how identical same-sex couples 
were to the heterosexual couples—how they would be unlikely to 
threaten the status quo.  Once the establishment was convinced 
of the sameness, sexual minorities were granted the right to 
marry.  In this way, making marriage equality appear as a “white 
issue” facilitated sameness arguments and also aligned the 
interests of between sexual minorities and the power-granting 
establishment.  As Franke notes, “[t]he racial endowment as 
                                                 
67 Id. at 534. 
68 Id.  
69 See Anthony Michael Kreis, Gay Gentrification: Whitewashed Fictions of 
LGBT Privilege and the New Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 31 Law & Ineq. 
117, 137-53 (2012). 
70 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). 
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white from which the marriage equality movement has benefited . 
. . surely helped conservative courts, legislators, and others come 
to see an affinity of interest with this cause.”71  This notion is so 
“even if not grounded in reality, since many of the members of the 
LGBT community who sought marriage rights were people of 
color.”72           
In propelling gay rights and legal protections, this strategy 
to align interests is not exclusive to the marriage issue.  Anthony 
Michael Kreis has drawn several accounts that reveal the impact 
of interest convergence in recent gay rights advances.73  Reading 
together Justice Scalia’s dissent in Romer v. Evans74 and Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,75 Kreis argues 
that the Supreme Court’s reversal of Bowers v. Hardwick76 
involved several layers of interest convergence.  With Romer, 
Kreis has discerned that Scalia’s scathing dissent was a reaction 
to the undercurrent of white privilege that helped convince the 
majority of Amendment 2’s animus:  “[Scalia’s] intent was surely 
to highlight that the LGBT community is a powerful and visible 
force within the legal community and that visibility makes it 
easier for his fellow Justices to grant rights to a group of people 
with whom lawyers typically associate.”77  Sameness facilitated 
Romer’s outcome.  Kreis then pairs the resonance of Scalia’s 
Romer dissent with the passage in Kennedy’s majority opinion in 
Lawrence, when sameness was used to connote the discriminatory 
effect of sodomy laws.78  As Kennedy distinguished the facts of 
the case from a case that might have involved minors, 
nonconsensual sex, public indecency, prostitution, or legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships, he stated that Lawrence, on 
the contrary, “involve two adults who, with full and mutual 
consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a 
homosexual lifestyle.”79  As such, “[t]he petitioners are entitled to 
                                                 
71 Franke, supra n. __, at 250. 
72 Id. 
73 See generally Kreis, supra n. __. 
74 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
75 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
76 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
77 Kreis, supra n. __, at 148. 
78 Id. at 149. 
79 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see also Kreis, supra n.__, at 149. 
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respect for their private lives.”80  Kennedy imbued the petitioners 
with sameness rhetoric by drawing them in broad enough terms—
“two adults”81 who were consensually “engaged in sexual 
practices”82—but at the same time juxtaposing their case and 
predicament away from situations of real vice—pedophilia, rape, 
indecency, or prostitution—or a situation of larger societal or 
normalizing scope—perhaps same-sex marriage.  The petitioners 
were just having consensual sex.  What’s the harm in that?  At 
the same time, Kennedy seems to show how the petititoners’ 
interests aligned with the decision-making establishment 
because, according to Kreis, the passage “emphasizes that there is 
no harm to heteronormative norms with the majority’s 
decision.”83  Furthermore, by the time Lawrence weighed the 
legality of same-sex intimacy, other heteronormative institutions 
that might have been once threatened by the overturning of 
Bowers—such as religious organizations—already had such 
threats “neutralized” in other Supreme Court decisions.84  Such 
neutralization of threats that Lawrence might have posed further 
demonstrated the aligning of interests that helped reverse 
Bowers: “The Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence opinions are strong 
evidence that once shared identity interests are realized, judicial 
remedies favoring sexual minorities will be authorized provided 
they do not undermine the power or authority of peer 
heterosexual stakeholders.”85  In other words, the legal 
protections sexual minorities were asking for can be granted so 
long as such protections would not threaten the heteronormative 
status quo.      
Similarly, Nourafshan and Onwuachi-Willig illustrate one 
particularly glaring instance of interest convergence in U.S. v. 
Windsor86:  
                                                 
80 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see also Kreis, supra n.__, at 149. 
81 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.  
82 Id. 
83 Kreis, supra n.__, at 149. 
84 Id. at150. 
85 Id. at151. 
86 Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra n. __, at 522-23; 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013).   
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Under the theory of interest convergence, Edith 
Windsor, a wealthy, white woman in a long-term 
committed relationship in New York City, was, in 
many ways, the perfect plaintiff to challenge DOMA 
because she could be sold as part of a respectable, 
assimilation-based gay image to the general public 
and, more importantly, to those in power.87 
Particular aspects of Windsor’s marriage to her deceased spouse 
Thea Spyer seemed conducive for drawing sameness arguments.  
According to Nourafshan and Onwuachi-Willig, Windsor’s 
“wedding was ‘mainstream’ enough to be featured in the New 
York Times wedding section, even though the state of New York 
did not recognize same-sex marriage until 2012.”88  In addition, 
“[b]oth Windsor, who holds a Master’s degree from N.Y.U., and 
Spyer, who has a Ph.D., have elite pedigrees in terms of 
education.”89  The combination of these attributes made the 
conclusion viable that “Edie Windsor closely hues to the image of 
homosexuality that has been consciously crafted in the public 
sphere.”90 
 Beyond the ways her identity could be construed as 
“conforming to society’s perceived normative ideal in all ways 
expect for sexuality,”91 the financial losses associated with how 
the Defense of Marriage Act discriminated against her state-
recognized marriage on the federal level (charging her $363,053 
in estate taxes) made her “sympathetic.”92  In deconstructing the 
image that Windsor presented, Nourafshan and Onwuachi-Willig 
tease out the converging interests.  Windsor’s estate taxes dispute 
could be “highly salient to white elites, both gay and non-gay 
alike.”93  Her “respectability-based identity as a lesbian 
represented a departure from the stereotype of hyper-sexuality 
that is often affiliated with or imputed to gay culture.”94  
                                                 
87 Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra n. __, at 522. 
88 Id. at 522 n. 7. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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Windsor’s “racial identity as a white woman reified the primacy of 
whiteness in the gay community and gay rights movement.”95  
Not to mention, “her identity as an educated Northerner 
reinforced notions of sophistication and assimilation in the gay 
and lesbian community.”96  Combined together, these attributes 
“helped to remove the stigma of otherness (to an extent) and thus 
enabled broad swaths of people to identify with her.”97  Of course, 
according to Nourafshan and Onwuachi-Willig, aligning interests 
between Windsor and the establishment here also created the 
inverse problem—using her attributes to draw similarities in 
interest “also implicitly worked to mark those who did not fit this 
normative ideal as outsiders.”98 
D. THE OBERGEFELL COUPLES 
 In examining Obergefell plaintiffs, Cynthia Godsoe has 
noted that attorneys’ strategies in managing their plaintiffs’ 
“ordinariness” and “approachability” hinged on portraying a sense 
of normality.99  Animating both the selection of the twenty-nine 
Obergefell plaintiffs and their performance of attributes, the 
strategy of being normal was targeted chiefly toward members of 
the Court in ways that maximized and ensured sufficient interest 
convergence that would render positive outcomes:   
[T]he Supreme Court is mainstream in its own way, 
composed of nine individuals from a very narrow 
slice of the population. Skilled advocates “play by its 
rules, and tell the Justices stories they like to hear 
about people who remind them of themselves.”  In 
other words, plaintiffs should assimilate to norms 
that the Justices understand and their lawyers 
should play down differences.100  





99 Godsoe, supra n. __, at 136. 
100 Id. at 136-40 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Dahlai Lithwick, Extreme 
Makeover: The Story Behind the Story of Lawrence v. Texas, NEW YORKER 
(Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/12/extreme-
makeover-dahlia-lithwick) (emphasis added). 
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In doing so, Godsoe observes that result of such elaborate 
perception-building “reveals some deep-rooted assumptions about 
what a family should look like and what is an appropriate path to 
social change.”101  Assimilationist strategies would likely fit that 
path.  According to Godsoe’s research, the Obergefell plaintiffs 
were “largely homogenous and non-representative of LGB 
families,”102 and their similarities and attributes can be 
categorized and compiled into to an archetypal scheme.  Though 
self-identified as sexual minorities, the Obergefell plaintiffs 
appear to Godsoe to share four common traits; they are (1) 
typically all-American, (2) asexual, (3) devoted to childrearing 
and/or caregiving, and (4) accidentally political.103   
What Godsoe describes as “all-American” is synonymous 
with “reflect[ing] a traditional ‘Leave it to Beaver’ American 
ideal”104 typified by their “overwhelmingly white and middle or 
upper-middle class”105 composition that is “starkly different than 
the gay and lesbian population.”106  In fact, only five Obergefell 
plaintiffs are white, and out of sixteen couples, just three are 
racially mixed.107  These ratios amongst the Obergefell plaintiffs 
here are incongruous and unrepresentative of the racial 
breakdown in LGBT population as Godsoe reports.108  
Moreover, to continue building their all-American features, 
Godsoe notes that they “all have eminently respectable jobs.”109  
She illuminates this all-Americanness using one particular 
example of an actual Obergefell plaintiff-couple:  “[T]wo attractive 
veterinary professors who were recruited because they are ‘in a 
stable, good relationship,’ and are ‘likeable’ ‘homeowners’ with 
respectable jobs.”110  In other words, using Godsoe’s own synonym 
for all-American, the Obergefell plaintiffs are more or less 
                                                 
101 Id. at 140. 
102 Id. at 145. 
103 Id. 
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 See id. at 139. 
109 Id. at 146. 
110 Id. at 138.  
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“mainstream.”111  Extrapolating from Godsoe’s research, this 
group of litigants exhibited fewer or nearly no features that would 
personify them readily as “queer”; they do not appear to embody 
particularized attributes normally associated with sexual 
minority life, status, or culture.  There are no transpeople or HIV-
positive individuals amongst these plaintiffs.112  Nor did these 
litigants possess less-seemingly “respectable” jobs, 
characteristics, or backgrounds that would label them alternative 
from the mainstream in some way.113  They are overwhelmingly 
white and privileged, and present themselves and their families 
as “ ‘do[ing] exactly the same things as everyone else does,’ ”114 or 
they consider themselves “ ‘just as boring and crazy and loud as 
any other family.’ ”115  In essence, one can alternatively designate 
what Godsoe identifies as “all-American” or “mainstream” in the 
Obergefell plaintiffs as assimilated characteristics.   
 Likewise, Godsoe noted that Obergefell plaintiffs were 
“asexual” or de-sexualized116—meaning that their highly-crafted 
image avoided the stereotypical notions of gay promiscuity or 
even reminded the public or the Court of non-heteronormative 
sex:  “Not one of the many photographs and videos available 
online depict a plaintiff kissing his or her partner.  Sex is never 
mentioned.”117  Rather their “asexual” images portray 
monogamous couples committed in their relationships to one-
another.118  To borrow from Kreis’ observations regarding interest 
convergence from Lawrence,119 the de-sexualization of plaintiffs 
here likely serves to signal and underscore their non-threatening 
nature—how the qualities of their same-sex relationships (which 
would include aspects of sex and sexual intimacy) would not 
threaten the establishment’s social order.  The irony here is that 
the Obergefell attorneys’ needed to de-sexualize their plaintiffs 
before the public and the Justices despite the progress already 
                                                 
111 Id. at 145. 
112 Id.  
113 Id. (noting no plaintiff with criminal histories or tattoos).  
114 Id. 147  
115 Id.  
116 Id. at 147-48. 
117 Id. at 148. 
118 Id. 
119 Kreis, supra n. __, at 149. 
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made by the Court in Lawrence to decriminalize consensual same-
sex intimacy—in other words, despite the Court having 
neutralized that threat.120  Thus, the tactic to de-sexualize the 
Obergefell plaintiffs here seem overprotective, and overstates the 
notion in Lawrence that consensual same-sex sexual activity bore 
no harm to the establishment; the truth about the sex in 
controversy in Lawrence was that it was unlikely to have met 
traditionally nuclear and heteronormative standards as the 
Lawrence litigants involved were likely not a committed couple.121  
In Obergefell, the plaintiffs’ could not threaten the status quo 
because they appeared so asexual or sterile that sex was 
categorically avoided.  Simultaneously, the move also appears 
regressive as if intended to avoid the connotations that sodomy in 
Bowers had engendered122 or perhaps reach back further to early 
same-sex marriage cases when the primacy of procreative sex 
quashed any advancement of granting same-sex couples the right 
to marry.123  All in all, the prophylactic move to de-sexualize 
Obergefell plaintiffs seemed aimed to neutralize any indication of 
threat to the mainstream social order.   
 According to Godsoe, the Obergefell plaintiffs were also 
engaged in childrearing at a degree much higher than statistics 
for the sexual minority population, or, if they did not have 
children, was often engaged in caretaking responsibilities for 
either their partners or parents.124  Godsoe observed that 
caregiving “not only further desexualizes LGB relationship, but 
also entrenches the privatization of dependency, exempting the 
state from responsibility for supporting the disabled and 
children.”125  But not only does caregiving facilitates the “reward” 
for receiving legal recognition of marriage, as Godsoe describes,126 
the use of childrearing and caregiving also aligns the interests of 
sexual minorities with the establishment by again minimizing 
same-sex relationships as non-threatening and appearing to hold 
                                                 
120 539 U.S. at 566-79. 
121 Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
1464, 1478 (2004). 
122 Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986). 
123 Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971). 
124 Godsoe, supra n. __, at 149. 
125 Id. at 150. 
126 Id. 
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up the values of childrearing and family subscribed by the 
mainstream—suggesting hints of assimilation in this attribute as 
well.  One is reminded by the quote from House of Cards:  
“Everyone can get behind children.”127  This suggestion remains 
even if the Obergefell plaintiffs overstate the prevalence of 
childrearing amongst the sexual minority population.128            
 Finally, Godsoe perceives Obergefell plaintiffs as political 
outsiders, calling them “Accidental Activists.”129  Indeed, “[t]he 
final ingredient in the perfect plaintiff [in Obergefell] is a disdain 
for politics.  The Obergefell plaintiffs have been cast as ‘ordinary’ 
folks who just happened to get involved[.]”130  They claim not to 
be “activists” but just interested in their private existence.131  Yet, 
their apolitical nature seems disingenuous to Godsoe, who notes 
their public involvement with the press, appearances at advocacy 
events, contributions to the media, and attendance at Supreme 
Court arguments once they were selected as plaintiffs.132  Again, 
the “apolitical” narratives seem to lessen any “activist” 
connotations, perhaps adding to their non-threatening personas.   
 All in all, Godsoe’s intricate scholarship here on the 
Obergefell plaintiffs details motivated interest convergence that 
underscores the reason why attorneys opted for an assimilationist 
strategy—one that complements and proves on a litigative scale 
Katherine Franke’s remark about the collateral rebranding of the 
gay identity by the movement’s focus on obtaining marriage 
equality.133  Franke’s observations about racial marginalization in 
the marriage litigation also match Godsoe’s on Obergefell:  “When 
the lawyers and the clients in the gay marriage cases stand on 
the steps of the Supreme Court after arguing their case for 
marriage equality, all, or nearly all, of them are white.”134  Major 
coverage of recent marriage cases feature white individuals as 
plaintiffs and attorneys; noted leaders at major gay  organizations 
                                                 
127 House of Cards: Chapter 1 (Netflix Feb. 1, 2013). 
128 Godsoe, supra n. __, at 149. 
129 Id. at 150. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 151. 
132 Id. at 151-52 (“They protest too much.”) 
133 Franke, supra n. __, at 247. 
134 Id. at 251. 
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involved in marriage equality advances have also been white.135  
But despite the images of incongruity between the sexual 
minorities at the frontlines of the marriage equality movement 
and those residing within the sexual minority population as a 
whole, the assimilationist strategy and the interest convergence 
ultimately worked to convince the Court to give same-sex couples 
the right to marry in Obergefell.136  Identifying marriage as the 
“keystone of our social order,” Kennedy ultimately extended such 
right to plaintiff same-sex couples.137    
E. HIERARCHICAL EFFECTS 
If Franke and others are correct that the assimilationist 
strategy in advancing toward marriage equality succeeded in 
rebranding the perception of the gay identity as predominately 
white, upper-middle class, then this result leaves out a 
substantial reality about the sexual minority population as a 
whole.  Amongst the LGBTQ population, racial and economic 
stratification mirrors that of the general population in the U.S.138  
For better or worse, with marriage having arisen as the top 
priority of the gay rights movement in the last two decades, a 
skewed representation of the gay identity has emerged to help 
obtain formal equality at the expense of underprivileged voices in 
the sexual minority population.  The problem is multifold.  First, 
such success in formal equality using assimilationist strategies 
has, in essence, led to the replication of racial and 
underprivileged subordination within the architecture of such 
formal equality established in cases such as Windsor and 
Obergefell.  On the one hand, the sameness arguments and 
interest convergence have only gotten the movement so far.  In 
Windsor, Kennedy essentially replicated and extended his use of 
rationality with bite from Romer.139  While in Obergefell, he 
                                                 
135 Id.  
136 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601-02 (2015). 
137 Id. at 2601. 
138 See, e.g., Gary J. Gates, Williams Inst., LGBT Demographics: Comparisons 
Among Population-Based Surveys (2014), http:// 
williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/lgbt-demogs-sep-2014.pdf. 
139 See Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, The Case for LGBT Equality 
Reviving the Political Process Doctrine and Repurposing the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1015, 1048 (2016). 
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extended the right to marry primarily based on 14th amendment 
due process considerations—reflective of a similar stroke he used 
in Lawrence—and left a very thin equality jurisprudence hinged 
again on due process considerations, not on any heightened 
scrutiny analysis.140  As Kreis remarked about lower district and 
appellate court marriage decisions that rendered favorably for 
same-sex couples, “[f]rom a judge’s perspective, it might very well 
be considerably difficult to apply a more exacting level of judicial 
review to a class of people that appear privileged.”141  In that way, 
the sameness arguments have a plateauing limit based on Bell’s 
interest convergence thesis:  “So long as the interests of judges 
and White elites remain converged with the interest of the LGBT 
community due to a perceived common intersection of identity, 
and so long as remedies for LGBT discrimination do not 
undermine heteronormative interests, LGBT rights will 
ultimately prevail.”142   Examined this way, the contours of 
formal equality from recent advancement in gay rights are 
problematic.  The encasement of hierarchy and privilege within 
advances for formal equality for sexual minorities makes such 
formal equality, once obtained, less than ideal—somewhat 
pernicious even—as a form of equality.  Of course, same-sex 
couples do receive benefits through marriage.  But because 
marriage was achieved through assimilationist strategies that 
aligned interests between privileged sexual minorities and the 
establishment, such achievements carry with them a certain level 
of taint.  
Internally amongst sexual minorities, assimilationist 
strategies that accomplished, in part, the rebranding of the gay 
identity for the mainstream have also committed erasure for non-
white, intersectional sexual minorities.  For instance, as 
Nourafshan and Onuachi-Willig noted, the assimilationist, 
sameness strategies used in Windsor “enabled broad swaths of 
people to identify with [Edith Windsor]” but “also implicitly 
worked to mark those who did not fit this normative ideal as 
outsiders.”143  As Stewart Chang has remarked, “[w]hen formal 
                                                 
140 See 135 S. Ct. at 2603-05. 
141 Kreis, supra n. __, at 160. 
142 Id. at 161. 
143 Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra n. __, at 523. 
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equality is tied to marriage, only those who subscribe to and have 
access to the institution of marriage are able to attain 
equality.”144  Thus, marriage equality furthers sexual minority 
subordination by “stifl[ing] heterogeneous sexualities.”145  All of 
this effectively stretches the existing marginalization of 
underprivileged and/or racial sexual minorities who do not fit the 
model created by assimilationist strategies.    
Going forth, assimilationist strategies here will prove to be 
an obstacle in future advances for true equality.  First, according 
to Kreis’ take on Bell’s interest convergence, gay rights will only 
prevail so long as interests are aligned and reparations for 
discrimination do not disturb the status quo.146  Because the 
interests of sexual minorities who do not appear assimilated do 
challenge establishment norms—whether racially, economically, 
or otherwise—further advances in the areas of employment and 
housing discrimination, where intersectional members are 
affected more often, will likely face stagnancy.  Such a result 
means that the progress for advancing sexual minorities has 
stalled since Obergefell and will likely taper unless a 
transformative strategy intervenes.  As Part III will show, that 
stagnancy is apparent in aspects of the Masterpiece decision.    
III.  UNALIGNED INTERESTS IN MASTERPIECE 
 The Masterpiece dispute originated in 2012 when Charlie 
Craig and David Mullins,  a Colorado same-sex couple, tried to 
order a custom-made wedding cake from Masterpiece Cakeshop 
and its owner-baker, Jack Phillips.147  Because Colorado did not 
recognize same-sex marriages at the time, Craig and Mullins had 
planned to marry lawfully in Massachusetts and then return to 
Colorado to celebrate their out-of-state marriage.148  A custom-
ordered wedding cake from Phillip’s shop would have been part of 
that celebration.149  Upon hearing that Craig and Mullins wanted 
                                                 
144 Stewart Chang, Is Gay the New Asian?:  Marriage Equality and the Dawn of 
a New Model Minority, 23 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5, 26-27 (2016). 
145 Id. at 27. 
146 Kreis, supra n. __, at 161. 
147 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018). 
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a custom wedding cake for their party, Phillips refused, and later 
claimed that baking and selling a cake that celebrated a same-sex 
wedding was contrary to his Christian beliefs.150  Craig and 
Mullins subsequently complained against Phillips and his bakery 
to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, alleging sexual 
orientation discrimination under the public accommodations 
section of Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”).151  The 
couple’s claim succeeded before the Commission and Phillips 
appealed.152  The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the 
Commission’s findings that Phillips had discriminated against 
Craig and Mullins.153  Yet in its 2017-2018 term, the Supreme 
Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision, ruling that the 
Commission and the appeals court did not exercise religious 
neutrality when examining the baker’s actions.154  The finding of 
religious hostility allowed the Court to pass on deciding whether 
substantively CADA ought to prevail in favor of Craig and 
Mullins or whether Phillips’ speech and religious exercise rights 
under the First Amendment were violated.155  The Court, instead, 
turned to criticizing the adjudicating processes below to reset the 
postures of the case.156         
A.  QUEERING THE RESPONDENTS 
In contrast to the assimilated and mainstream identities 
that the same-sex couples projected during the Obergefell 
litigation, the same-sex couple in Masterpiece did not appear as 
readily assimilated when they engaged in their legal battles over 
an instance of alleged sexual orientation discrimination.   
Although Craig and Mullins are both racially white and male, 
they did not share many of the other “normalized” similarities 
with the Obergefell plaintiffs.  Substantially missing from Craig 
and Mullins’ public personas were characteristics that would have 
easily fallen within any of Godsoe’s four archetypal traits of gay 
assimilation in Obergefell: (1) projections of all-Americanness; (2) 
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asexuality; (3) childrearing or caretaking obligations; and (4) 
accidental activism.157  If Godsoe’s four categories are to be taken 
at some value for what it means to be gay and assimilated—at 
least in the Obergefell universe—then under a similar analysis, 
Craig and Mullins would stand outside the contours of 
assimilation.   
1.  Not Mainstream All-American  
First, the couple here appears less mainstream or “all-
American” than the Obergefell plaintiffs.  Neither of them have 
jobs or careers that would survive a judgmental, status-driven 
scrutiny; neither of them have careers comparable to those held 
by the Obergefell plaintiffs that Godsoe had termed “eminently 
respectable.”158  During the case, only one of the two, Mullins, had 
professional employment, but only as an office manager at a real 
estate firm.159  Craig, meanwhile, was not employed despite his 
interior design training; during the years of litigation he had 
stalled in launching his career.160  Also, to further deviate from 
perceived respectability, Mullins, aside from his day-job as an 
office manager, admitted to harboring literary ambitions as a 
poet.161  The couple neither embodied the more stable, upper-
middle class professional template that Godsoe had identified 
with the Obergefell plaintiffs or, to extend comparisons further 
back to Windsor, possessed the wealth or elite educations that 
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer had.162  Of course, Craig and 
Mullins could be millionaires in private.  But on the surface, their 
professional and class identities vastly deviated from the upper 
middle-class image of prior marriage equality plaintiffs. 
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Culturally, Craig and Mullins also did not embody “all-
American” identities, nor project themselves as “Leave It to 
Beaver”-types either—borrowing Godsoe’s phraseology.  Neither 
seemed to have served in the military and thus would lack the 
easy connotation that service could graft to create a conventional 
sense of patriotism.163  Additionally, in their physical 
appearances, Craig and Mullins did not exhibit the “gendered” 
norms of hetero-masculinity typical of a “Leave It to Beaver,” 
traditionally all-American world.   Various media photographs of 
the couple during their litigation depicted them adhering less to a 
“straightacting,” hetero-masculine script.  Indeed, they often 
played with gender expectations with their physical choices in 
clothing, hairstyle, and jewelry. For instance, on the day of the 
Supreme Court arguments, both Mullins and Craig stood outside 
the Supreme Court Building in suits and ties.164  However, 
deviating from traditional dark suits and conservative shirt-and-
tie combinations, Mullins wore a brighter navy blue suit with his 
shirt and patterned tie both in dark purple, while Craig wore an 
all purple ensemble except for his bright white tie that stood out 
vividly along with his stylized hair dyed in platinum lavender.165  
The couple matched themselves more than their attorneys, and 
would have been easily noticed—deliberately so.  By stark 
contrast, at Obergefell oral arguments, Jim Obergefell wore a 
traditional black suit paired with a lighted-colored checkered 
shirt and tie that was trendy but more conventional.166  Beyond 
judicial appearances, the Masterpiece couple’s other public image 
                                                 
163 Godsoe, supra n. __, at 146. 
164 See, e.g., Lucia Graves, ‘This Happens All the Time’: Why A Gay Couple 
Took Their Cake Case to the Supreme Court, The Guardian (Jan. 18, 2018) 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/18/colorado-cake-shop-case-
supreme-court (showing photograph of the Masterpiece couple at the Supreme 
Court Building). 
165 Id.; see also Jeffrey Toobin, Justices Ginsburg and Kagan Ask About the 
Artistry of Wedding Cakes, NEW YORKER (Dec. 5, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/justices-ginsburg-and-kagan-
ask-about-the-artistry-of-wedding-cakes (showing the couple in full). 
166 E.g., Michael S. Rosewald, A Day in Court for Jim Obergefell, the Face of the 
Historic Gay Marriage Case, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/a-day-in-court-for-jim-obergefell-the-
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Obergefell at Supreme Court Building on argument day). 
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choices in the media also exhibited their play with traditional 
masculine expectations.  Often the couple was photographed 
wearing flashy, ostentatious clothing and alternative jewelry.167  
Instead of keeping a stable sense of physical appearance, they 
varied their hair and grooming—especially Mullins who appear 
from one photographical moment to the next altering his hair 
colors and lengths, maintaining what some might deem a more 
“androgynous” look.168  Meanwhile, Craig often sported a sharply-
trimmed beard and would seem to be the less androgynous of the 
two, but he also changed his hair color from time to time as 
well.169  Compared to traditional, unwavering notions of all-
American male-ness, frequent variations in appearances would 
connote destabilizing “gendered” characteristics and even 
personality traits of instability.  In contrast to the Obergefell 
plaintiffs, Craig and Mullins projected an image that suggested 
they were not doing “exactly the same things as everyone else 
does.”170  Stereotypically, they seemed more diverse, and less 
“family-oriented.”  In other words, they appeared “alternative,” 
rather than “normal” or “mainstream”—even “queer” rather than 
“gay,” against the Obergefell template.               
2.  Not Asexual 
                                                 
167 See, e.g., David Crary, Opponents in LGBT Case Agree: It's Not About 
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Secondly, unlike the Obergefell plaintiffs, Craig and 
Mullins did not obscure or hide their sexuality.  Many of the 
couple’s public photos offered examples of them not shying away 
from affectionate gestures that could remind the public of their 
same-sex sexual desires or attractions.  Often they were 
photographed in loving poses—ranging from holding hands171 and 
slight, suggestive embracing172 all the way to mouth-to-mouth 
kissing173—even kissing on the Supreme Court Building steps.174  
Their photograph in an NBC news feature in December 2017 
depicted them casually but affectionately huddled together in a 
public setting—Mullins with his body and legs curled in a loose 
but upright fetal position against Craig, who was closely flanked 
and attentive to holding Mullins.175  Noticeably, Craig’s right 
hand was reaching over the bottom of Mullins’ thighs while his 
left hand was draped over the space between his own open legs, 
covering his genitals.176  Another photograph with Politico 
showing the couple kissing seemed to have been done with a bit of 
provocative intent.177  In addition to their visual displays of same-
sex affection, the couple also discussed their physical affections 
publicly.  In one interview, Mullins even recounted a personal 
                                                 
171 See, e.g., U.S. Supreme Court Questions Bias in 'Gay Wedding Cake' Case, 
BBC News (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
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experience of gay public affection with a previous lover as both a 
liberating life event and a moment of personal bravery and pride, 
describing the gesture of intimate handholding in public as “the 
most normal thing in the world”178 and “the first moment in my 
life where I presented myself as unabashedly gay in a public 
space.”179  In their NBC news interview, the couple revealed that 
their decision to marry came during an intimate moment while 
“[t]hey were cuddling on their couch.”180  From that statement, 
one could facetiously interpret that the whole entire case of 
Masterpiece might not have resulted, but for this one moment of 
intimacy.  
Although public displays of affection between opposite-sex 
couples are so frequent to render them commonplace, if one 
situated Craig and Mullins’ affectionate gestures back into the 
hands (and bodies) of a male same-sex couple, their gestures 
could have appeared so unfamiliar or unnatural to some in the 
mainstream that such displays seemed threatening on several 
levels.  First, Craig and Mullins’ public displays of affection could 
seem antithetical to the image of the respectable gay couple that 
has been built up, for instance, by the de-sexualized, assimilated 
impressions left by the Obergefell plaintiffs.181  Craig and Mullins’ 
public gestures risked reminding the world of their sexuality and 
hinted at the consensual intimacy behind closed doors.  In that 
way, their public displays of affection would have violated the 
tenets of gay respectability.  According to Yuvraj Joshi, “Lesbians 
and gays may produce performances of respectability as defensive 
strategies against being sexualized.  Respectability may be a 
means  of  stopping  their sexuality from becoming a barrier to 
their success and happiness or a safe  space  away  from  the  pain  
and  suffering  of  homophobia.”182  In comparison to any notions 
of assimilation, Craig and Mullins’ public displays of affection 
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(2012) [Joshi, Respectable Queerness]. 
32         QUEER SACRIFICE                         [Vol. __ 
 
 
Forthcoming, to be published in the Yale Journal of Law & Feminism. 
Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission. 
could have been interpreted as flaunting—a heightened reaction 
of threat even though Lawrence has legally sanctioned even the 
most intimate forms of such acts between same-sex couples.    
On another level, their affection also had the potential to 
risk distinguishing their sex acts from those of opposite-sex 
couples.  The image of two men being affectionate with each other 
rather than the image of a man and a woman doing the same 
could have triggered responses that distinguished consensual 
same-sex intimacy from consensual acts of opposite-sex intimacy; 
one way to do so would be by focusing on the latter’s procreative 
agency.183  Such images could also distinguish by triggering 
stereotypical connotations of promiscuity, deviancy, and disease 
historically associated with negative, biased opinions of gay sex, 
particularly of the kind that contributed to the political 
marginalization of sexual minorities during the AIDS crisis.184  
As a male same-sex couple rather than an opposite-sex couple, 
their abundant public images of affection could have alienated 
them from “mainstream” individuals who typically regarded 
same-sex affection as prurient, or just plain foreign.  Such 
imagery and affectionate public displays reinforced their 
sexuality, enhanced the danger for social distinction, and even 
perhaps provoked homophobic reactions.  This affect would undo 
the sameness arguments within gay assimilationist tactics and 
engender a heteronormative disapproval. 
3.  Not Family-Oriented Caretakers 
According to Godsoe, involvement in childrearing or family 
caretaking was the third archetypal characteristic of gay 
assimilation the Obergefell plaintiffs displayed.185  By contrast, in 
the public revelations about their lives, the Masterpiece plaintiffs 
made no mentioning of childrearing or caretaking of a loved one—
neither of the two seemed to have any adopted or biological 
children nor did they seem involved in caretaking of a family 
member; instead Craig and Mullins projected the image of a 
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young, mobile couple who traveled, attended media parties, and 
were essentially carefree from familial responsibilities than the 
same-sex couples in Obergefell.186  Thus, they risked associating 
themselves with the kind of domestic values and family image 
that the Obergefell plaintiffs projected.187  In Craig and Mullins’ 
case, non-existent attachment to a domestic, family-oriented 
lifestyle left their lives up for alternative interpretations.  In 
contrast to the effect that caregiving had on further “de-
sexualizing” the Obergefell plaintiffs and their relationships, the 
lack of caregiving or childrearing here could have had the 
opposite effect.  It suggested that Craig and Mullins had less 
domesticated lives and were more easily differentiated from 
“respectable” or responsible gay couples who do have children and 
do take care of sick dependents.   They seemed more hedonistic 
than the Obergefell plaintiffs—less selfless with their time and 
resources than gay couples helping to rear society’s next 
generation or caring for the elderly.  Moreover, being childless 
and independent disqualifies them from “the reward of 
caregiving” that has accompanied marriage equality cases 
previously.188  This image had the slippery effect of making their 
marriage seem less dignified and less worthy of recognition.                  
4.  Not Accidental Activists 
Lastly, although Craig and Mullins have claimed that they 
were—as the Obergefell plaintiffs had been—“accidental 
activists,”189 they seemed inconsistent in during interviews about 
just how “accidental” they were.  First, they contradicted their 
own claims that they had no prior interest in LGBTQ activism.  
During interviews, they mentioned that they both “actually tried 
to avoid politics when they decided to get married”190 and they 
“were never activists in the gay rights movement.”191  That 
seemed more true for Mullins, who claimed he “considered 
himself apolitical until the day he and Craig were turned away at 
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Masterpiece Cakeshop.”192  But in another interview, Craig 
revealed he did harbor some prior activist experiences:  “Craig, an 
alumnus of University of Wyoming in Laramie, said 15 years ago 
he was a board member of a student LGBT group that sought to 
raise awareness for the Matthew Shepard Foundation and HIV 
testing.”193  In fact, Craig seemed to harbor latent motives for 
activism because early experiences of being ostracized for his 
sexuality were “hardships” that eventually “pushed him to fight 
for himself on the cake case.”194  Secondly, the act of pursuing a 
case of sexual orientation discrimination against Phillips and the 
bakery intrinsically seemed like a deliberate gesture of activism.  
After suffering from the humiliation of Phillips’ refusal, the 
couple first took their story online to Facebook, “which quickly 
went viral worldwide in a couple of days.”195  Of course, the couple 
could have decided to forget the incident with Phillips and 
ordered their wedding cake from another bakery.  Taking their 
story to social media, instead, could have been read as attention-
seeking.  The Facebook posting led Mullins and Craig to the 
discovery that Colorado public accommodations law afforded 
them recourse.196  They got their wedding cake from another 
bakery.197  And then Lambda Legal and the ACLU became 
involved in their case.198 According to Mullins, “[e]ventually, 
someone at the ACLU found us and we spoke to them, and we 
decided to move forward to the complaint. . . . They sort of helped 
us file the paperwork a little bit, and then after that and much 
discussion on their part, they decided to take up the case.”199   
During their Supreme Court litigation, the couple 
participated very publicly. Until the decision was rendered, they 
had given over three hundred interviews, including interviews 
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with major news outlets.200  They were honored with the VH-1 
Trailblazer Award for their “public fight against LGBTQ 
discrimination.”201  Unlike plaintiffs in prior gay rights cases, 
such as Lawrence v. Texas, both Craig and Mullins appeared at 
the oral arguments at the Supreme Court.202  While in 
Washington, D.C. to attend the arguments, they made speeches 
at several rallies203 and felt that “it’s important for people to see 
us just for the fact of we’re standing up for ourselves.”204  It was 
by chance that Craig and Mullins had experienced discrimination 
at the Masterpiece Cakeshop; they had not expected Phillips to 
refuse them based on his religious beliefs.205  Some of the facts of 
the case had accidental elements.  Yet, the couple’s subsequent 
reactions—taking their story to social media and speaking to 
major advocacy groups—suggested decisiveness in seeking action 
and recourse.  When pressed in one interview about the state of 
the LGBTQ community beyond their own lawsuit, Mullins 
remarked with a keen sense of political acumen:   
The three changes I see happening that most inspire 
me are the aggressive dismantling of the gender 
binary, the embrace of intersectionality, and the 
push to make sure that marginalized voices, the 
voices of transgender individuals, of non-white 
people, of women, are not silenced or filtered through 
the experiences of their cisgender, white male 
counterparts.206 
With less detail, but sharing a similar political tone, Craig 
responded to the same question with his analysis about gay 
visibility:   
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For a long time the concept of fitting in was really 
important and for good reason. Now, that we are 
becoming more accepted by the public in general, I 
see more people embracing their individuality, and 
showing that our differences are what make our 
culture unique. Pride month gives the necessary 
visibility to our shared humanity.207 
These seemingly-liberationist remarks reflected their admission 
after the Supreme Court decision was rendered that “they are 
lifetime activists now.”208  At that point, they could not claim to 
be reluctant or “accidental.”  In the reverse, they created an 
image of willingness to challenge an instance of sexual 
orientation discrimination against them personally and pursue it 
as part of a comprehensive political impetus for change.  For 
them, the personal had become political.        
B.  THREATENING THE STATUS QUO 
 It is difficult to envision sameness arguments when we 
place Craig and Mullins’ destabilizing sexualities within the 
context of queerness.  The notion of “queerness” itself evades a 
concrete and stable definition,209 and it is indeed theoretically 
less constant than the terms “gay and lesbian”—which in recent 
decades, have taken on more mainstream adoptions.210  Unlike 
“gay and lesbian,” the terminology “queer” does not merely 
describe sexual practices or demarcate certain traits, features, or 
conventions of same-sex lifestyles or practices; instead, whatever 
features that embodies “queerness” defy such identity-oriented 
classifications and exist as a means for “a destabilization of 
heterosexual hegemony.”211  Applying queerness to Craig and 
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Mullins’ public personas, this observation would affirm and 
explain how their sexualities appeared more destabilizing than 
the Obergefell plaintiffs for the Masterpiece Court.  They lacked 
the perceived socio-economic respectability of assimilated gay 
Americans.  They flaunted their sexuality in public.  They played 
with androgyny and avoided wearing conventional clothing to 
court appearances.  They were more deliberate as activists.  They 
dodged family-oriented responsibilities of childcare or caretaking.  
In essence, they affirmatively challenged the assimilated image of 
normalcy the Obergefell plaintiffs had embodied and curtailed 
any sameness arguments to be made for successfully increasing 
the levels of respectability and interest convergence.  Craig and 
Mullins did not “cover” their identities, but in fact they offered a 
representation of sexual minorities with features that perhaps 
distanced themselves too far away from mainstream dominant 
culture itself and its “reverse cover” expectations of “stable” gay 
and lesbian identities.212  As perceived, they are “less gay,” but 
could be quite “more queer.”  Consequently, major aspects of their 
public personas—their lifestyle, images, dress, personalities, 
political motivations, perceived dissociation from family values, 
occupations, and the like—destabilized both heteronormative 
associations of sexuality and connotations from mainstream gay 
assimilated culture as well.  It is quite possible that disruption 
could be taken as a threat to the heteronormative status quo. 
Indeed, the sense of threat could have provoked the Court’s less 
sympathetic reaction in Masterpiece. 
The destabilizing extent and perceived threat to the status 
quo engendered by Craig and Mullin’s queerness becomes more 
evident when considered within Justice Anthony Kennedy’s 
majority opinion in Masterpiece.  In both the state commission 
and Court of Appeal reviews, the couple obtained successful 
showings that Phillips’ refusal had amounted to sexual 
orientation discrimination under CADA.213  Nevertheless, without 
appearing assimilated, Craig and Mullins were unable to avail 
themselves to Kennedy’s dignity jurisprudence to the extent that 
marriage equality plaintiffs in Obergefell and Windsor previously 
had.  In Obergefell, assimilation had played well into Kennedy’s 
                                                 
212 Yoshino, supra n. __. 
213 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723. 
38         QUEER SACRIFICE                         [Vol. __ 
 
 
Forthcoming, to be published in the Yale Journal of Law & Feminism. 
Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission. 
dignity jurisprudence and eventually allowed the Court to extend 
marriage rights to same-sex couples.214  However, the manner in 
which Kennedy defined dignity in Obergefell revealed that he 
subscribed to a version of dignity that mandated respectability 
rather than a version premised on an individual’s inherent worth 
and respect.215  Within that paradigm, assimilated characteristics 
that illustrated how same-sex couples were invariably similar to 
opposite-sex couples permitted a comparison of respectability to 
be drawn where same-sex couples could seem just as respectable 
and as dignified as opposite-sex couples.216  From there, same-sex 
couples’ interest to have their relationships legally recognized as 
marriages were heightened and aligned with the establishment’s 
interest to preserve and protect the primacy of marriage.  As 
Kennedy wrote in Obergefell, plaintiffs there had sought the right 
to marry, “not to denigrate marriage but rather to live their lives, 
or honor their spouses’ memory, joined by its bond.”217  In 
addition, by referring to how past historical changes to marriage, 
such as the abandonment of coverture, have “strengthened, not 
weakened, the institution of marriage,” Kennedy suggested in 
Obergefell that extending the right to marry to same-sex couples 
would do the same.218  Thus, by relying on features of 
assimilation and respectability to sufficiently dignify same-sex 
couples in Obergefell, the legal interests of the plaintiffs there 
aligned with mainstream interests to preserve marriage’s 
institutional and social primacy.  In this way, Kennedy’s dignity 
jurisprudence in Obergefell became a vehicle that facilitated the 
interest convergence that eventually resulted in marriage 
equality.  
On the contrary, in Masterpiece, Craig and Mullins’ lack of 
comparable assimilated traits offered fewer opportunities for 
leveraging respectability within Kennedy’s dignity paradigm.  In 
terms of setting up the case inquiry that eventually revealed a 
denial of interest convergence for the Masterpiece couple, 
Kennedy begins at the outset of his decision by immediately 
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establishing unequal levels of regard for the two sides of the 
litigation.  Even before presenting the issues, Kennedy attempts 
to insinuate that what Craig and Mullins had requested from 
Phillips was somewhat illegitimate and as a result portrayed the 
couple in an undignified light.  Beyond reciting that Phillips had 
denied Craig and Mullins’ request for a custom wedding cake 
because of his religious views against same-sex marriages, 
Kennedy noted separately that Colorado had not recognized 
same-sex marriages at the time.219  This observation takes 
attention off Craig and Mullins’ sexual identities, which CADA 
protects, and suggests illicit conduct that would invariably bolster 
or support Phillips’ discriminatory refusal; after all, Craig and 
Mullins had been legally married in Massachusetts and were not 
officially seeking to be recognized as a married couple in Colorado 
at the time.220  The cake was merely to celebrate that occasion.221  
This slight reference that Colorado was not a marriage equality 
state at the time the couple ordered the cake from Phillips does 
not reflect their intentions; instead it misconstrues the facts and 
poses the dubious effect of insinuating that Craig and Mullins 
were asking for something they were not legally entitled to, and 
under that logic, Phillips would have been complicit had he 
agreed to their cake request.  In reality, Craig and Mullins was 
only asking Phillips to create a wedding cake to celebrate their 
legally-obtained, out-of-state marriage.  Again, they were not 
seeking Colorado’s recognition of their out-of-state marriage.  
Kennedy’s factual mischaracterization is one step in denying 
Craig and Mullins dignifying potential.  After all, it would seem 
hard to dignify—or even sympathize with—individuals who were 
refused for seeking something that was illegal.               
Another step toward denying dignifying potential is in 
Kennedy’s lack of acknowledgment of the Craig and Mullins’ 
personal characteristics compared to the way he had handled the 
personal facts of prominent Obergefell plaintiffs.  Obergefell had 
instances where Kennedy singled out assimilated traits of the 
litigants in order to show that denying marriage rights was 
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discriminatory and demeaning.222  Specifically, Kennedy had 
depicted the personal stigma and harm of Jim Obergefell’s 
erasure from his deceased husband’s death certificate, despite 
having cared extensively for his dying husband; how marriage 
discrimination threatened the family life of April DeBoer and 
Jayne Rowse, a lesbian couple who were nurses and fostered 
several children; and how Ijpe DeKoe, a diligent and honorable 
member of the Army Reserve, was demeaned when his marriage 
to Thomas Kostura was not recognized in their home state.223  All 
of this was done in close-up, dramatic effect. 
By contrast, throughout his Masterpiece opinion, Kennedy 
only mentions Craig and Mullins minimally, and when he does, it 
is transactional either to recite procedure224 or mere relevant 
facts.225  Such brief passages are devoid of any significant 
personalizing characteristics.  Kennedy refuses to explore just 
how being denied a wedding cake as a same-sex couple demeaned 
the couple’s human dignities.  There were no extrapolations of 
indignity—no dramatizations involving medical transport planes 
or missing names on death certificates.226  Instead, the only 
passages that bring up the possibility that sexual orientation 
discrimination can result in violating human dignity or stigma 
are in two brief sections when Kennedy postulates about gay 
couples and individuals in the abstract.227  To Kennedy, it seems 
quite possible that gay people can be demeaned in the 
marketplace if denied goods and services.228  But he never applies 
such abstractions to Craig and Mullins’ sexual orientation 
discrimination claim.  Again, motivating this silent denial might 
be the lack of sameness and respectability in Craig and Mullins’ 
identities, compared to litigants in the prior gay rights cases—
particularly in the marriage context.  Consequently, Kennedy’s 
rhetorical techniques for dignifying individuals—and with that, 
his entire dignity jurisprudence—evades Craig and Mullins.  This 
result stands even when their CADA claim for sexual orientation 
                                                 
222 E.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594-95. 
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224 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723-24, 1725. 
225 Id. at 1724. 
226 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594. 
227 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727-28, 1732. 
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discrimination had substantial merit, as attested in the lower 
state forums.  The incongruity is possible likely because at the 
Supreme Court level the couple did not exhibit the “stable,” gay 
assimilated characteristics that would have otherwise availed 
them access to Kennedy’s respectability line of dignity 
jurisprudence.  They just did not garner the type of dignity for the 
Court to fully sympathize with their pursuit of formal equality.  
Rather than being just “gay enough” to succeed, Craig and 
Mullins’ queerness seemed to have broken the boundaries that lie 
at the core of what assimilationist strategies have done to 
essentialize the gay identity.  The destabilizing effect of their 
queer sexualities undoubtedly clashed with the assimilationist 
images of litigants in the marriage equality cases and probably 
exceeded the Court’s tolerance of gay identities as well.  As a 
result, Craig and Mullins’ public personas perhaps deviated too 
far from expected notions of gayness, cultivated from both 
mainstream and gay assimilated angles—ideas which have stable 
connotations that support the image of respectability.  Quite 
possibly, this deviation, as the following will discuss, contributed 
to the Court’s reluctance to affirm their sexual orientation 
discrimination claim because they might have seemed too far 
from assimilated and too “queer” to connote the requisite 
sameness and dignifying respectability.   Instead, this incongruity 
was likely a threat to the status quo. 
C.  PRESERVING THE STATUS QUO 
Failing to satisfy each of Godsoe’s underscored 
characteristics of assimilation likely prevented Craig and Mullins 
from manifesting the version of gay assimilation and 
respectability propagated in the marriage cases.  Consequently, 
the couple could not avail themselves as readily to the sameness 
arguments that the Obergefell plaintiffs used in making their 
collective case for marriage equality.  They would have failed to 
appear “normal.”  In fact, they would have threatened the idea of 
“normal.”  Such distinctions afforded the Court opportunity to 
reinforce its interest to preserve the status quo against any 
interest to protect the couple’s queerness.       
1.  Reframing the Issues  
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To add to Kennedy’s refusal to dignify Craig and Mullins’ 
queerness in the way he had dignified the gay assimilated 
plaintiffs in the marriage cases, Kennedy also reframes the legal 
issues from how the claims had been discussed below.  The 
Colorado Court of Appeals had observed that the dispute involved 
both Craig and Mullins’ rights under CADA and Phillips’ claim 
that his speech and religious expression rights were violated, but 
then very quickly dismissed Phillips’ claim.229  Kennedy, on the 
other hand, begins his majority opinion by questioning the weight 
of Colorado’s public accommodations law and its respect for 
sexual minorities against a status quo that finds religious 
intolerance compelling.230  Then he articulates the issues as a 
struggle between of the level of protection for the “rights and 
dignity of gay persons who are or wish to be, married but who 
face discrimination when they seek goods or services”231 and “the 
right of all persons to exercise fundamental freedoms under the 
First Amendment, as applied to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”232  From here, it becomes even clearer 
that the decision will weigh these competing interests, framed in 
this way.  In recapitulating the issues thusly, Kennedy also 
legitimizes and raises the interest in protecting Phillips’ free 
speech and religious exercise contentions.  Indeed, he is focusing 
on the interest to preserve the status quo.  First, he observes 
sympathetically that Phillips’ free speech claim is “an instructive 
example, however, of the position that the application of 
constitutional freedoms in new contexts can deepen our 
understanding of their meaning.”233  Similarly, Kennedy finds 
that “[t]he same difficulties arise in determining whether a baker 
has a valid free exercise claim.”234  He alludes to potentially 
validating Phillips’ actions.  In essence, the effort to which 
Kennedy explains why Phillips’ free speech and religious exercise 
claims might pose difficulty in this case begins to establish what 
will be a plausible deniability that perhaps Phillips’ refusal could 
                                                 
229 See e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2015). 
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be constitutionally protected in light of Craig and Mullins’ CADA 
discrimination claim or suggest that he regards Phillips’ claims 
with more urgency than previous venues had.   
By juxtaposing of the issues and amplifying Phillip’s free 
speech and religious exercise claims, Kennedy hints at his 
potential deference to the status quo—one that is discriminatory.  
After all, despite marriage equality victories and the increasing 
positive image of sexual minorities in mainstream culture in the 
handful of years since Lawrence, the status quo has continued to 
recognize dominant religious views and sentiments—some that 
invariably have led to severe inequalities and legal detriments for 
sexual minorities and other marginalized people.  Nevertheless, 
such views have received constitutional protection.  For instance, 
in the face of legal and political advances for sexual minorities, 
many states have enacted religious freedom acts.235  In the same 
vein, after Obergefell, some states have relied on religion to 
motivate and legitimize bills that restrict restroom use for 
transgender people.236  And even the Supreme Court has recently 
prioritized religion over some aspects of women’s reproductive 
rights.237  As for anti-discrimination laws, many states, unlike 
Colorado, currently do not have legislation that protects sexual 
minorities,238 and the same can be echoed for the federal 
government.239  Whatever federal protections against 
discrimination that sexual minorities have received are limited in 
scope and have come by piecemeal through various federal 
agencies or governmental branches.240  In essence, a 
discriminatory status quo that is partly validated and 
perpetuated by religious freedom has received heightened legal 
                                                 
235 Findlaw, Religious Freedom Acts by State, Findlaw.org   
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protections, and from the beginning of Masterpiece, Kennedy 
raises a strong interest in preserving that status quo.   
2.  Weighing the Preservation Interest of the Status Quo 
Of course, Craig and Mullins do not exhibit sufficient 
dignity to match the interest to protect religious discrimination.  
In their initial respondents’ brief, Craig and Mullins used dignity 
to leverage interests.241  At the same time, Phillips also contested 
the couple’s dignitary interests.242  Thus, before arguments, the 
parties were already trying to access Kennedy’s dignity 
jurisprudence.  However, Craig and Mullins’ use of dignity 
seemed less heightened compared to the use of dignity by the 
Obergefell plaintiffs, which was much more direct in regards to 
relying on interest convergence and had observed dignity within 
contexts such as parenting and the discriminatory status quo.243  
Perhaps this less overt reliance on dignity and interest 
convergence was so because the Masterpiece couple had already 
prevailed against Phillips twice and technically had the law on 
their side.  After all, CADA did expressly protect against sexual 
orientation discrimination. And cases such as Lawrence, Windsor, 
and Obergefell all showed that the Court could favor same-sex 
couples.  Yet, the couple’s inability to play into the “respectable 
dignity” that accessed Kennedy’s gay rights jurisprudence ends 
up hurting their interests.244  Their inability to seem respectable 
because of their queerness affected the chances that their 
interests would substantively align with the Court’s interests to 
affirm the status quo.  In fact, their queerness challenged and 
threatened the status quo precisely through that inability to seem 
respectable under establishment norms.  Accordingly, the focus of 
the opinion was heavily on Phillips’ religious freedom—and by 
extension reinforcing the discriminatory status quo—even when 
Phillips did not fit within any religious protections under CADA.  
After all, the bakery was not a place “principally used for 
religious purposes” exempted by CADA.245  Therefore, technically 
                                                 
241 E.g., Brief for Respondents, supra n. __, at 41, 43. 
242 Brief for Petitioner, supra n. __, at 25, 54-61. 
243 Compare Brief for Respondents, supra n. __, with Brief for Petitioners at 19-
23, 31-32, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556). 
244 Joshi, Respectable Dignity, supra n. __. 
245 Colo. Rev. Stat. §24-34-601(1) (2017). 
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the couple’s discrimination claim had more validity under CADA 
than Phillips’ religious defenses.             
Particularly in Section II of his Masterpiece opinion, 
Kennedy underscores the primacy of protecting anti-gay religious 
sentiments, despite no available CADA exception for Phillips.  
Kennedy accomplishes this underscoring in part by articulating 
how Craig and Mullins came up short in their dignified 
respectability.  As he states, “[o]ur society has come to the 
recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as 
social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.”246  At first, 
Kennedy seems consonant with his recognition of same-sex 
couples in Obergefell.  By itself, the statement seems absolute in 
terms of protecting sexual minorities.  However, Kennedy 
immediately qualifies his declaration by writing, “For that reason 
the laws and the Constitution can, and in some instances must, 
protect them in the exercise of their civil rights.  The exercise of 
their freedom on terms equal to others must be given great 
weight and respect by the courts.”247  By inserting how the 
Constitution “can, and in some instances must” provide sexual 
minorities civil rights protections, he suggests subtly that 
negotiation exists at setting the level of interest in which 
protections of civil rights based on sexual orientation are given—
that there must be situations in which the Constitution has less 
interest in affording civil rights protections of sexual minorities 
even if their freedoms “on terms equal to others” are subject to 
“great weight and respect by the courts.”248  Other commentators 
have read this passage in Section II of Masterpiece Cakeshop with 
greater optimism because just on these three sentences alone one 
could read a friendly ambiguity in favor of sexual minorities into 
Kennedy’s statement.249  Such a reading, however, would ignored 
the series of further qualifications that follow in which Kennedy 
raises the importance of preserving religious views against same-
sex marriages:  “At the same time, the religious and philosophical 
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objections to gay marriage are protected views and in some 
instances protected forms of expression.”250  Here is where 
Kennedy repeats the disparity of interest levels.  Like the 
protection of the civil rights of sexual minorities, such religious 
views against marriage equality are not absolute either.  In the 
commercial context, these views are subject to public 
accommodation laws and would not survive so long as such laws 
are general and neutrally applicable.251  But he does not actually 
critique how CADA itself is not general and neutrally applicable.  
There is no direct attack premised on the opinion that Phillips’ 
bakery ought to have been exempt.  He is just weighing the 
interests.   
Constitutionally, despite public accommodations 
legislation, he notes that the law could not compel members of a 
religious clergy to perform same-sex wedding ceremonies if doing 
so clashed with the free exercise of religion.252  In fact, such 
protections of a clergy member’s refusal, based on freedom of 
religious exercise, to officiate a same-sex wedding ceremony is so 
sufficiently “well understood in our constitutional order as an 
exercise of religion” that Kennedy supposes sexual minorities 
could subordinate their rights in the face of such refusal—as “an 
exercise that gay persons could recognize and accept without 
serious diminishment to their own dignity and worth.”253  Such 
an overly-presumptuous observation patronizes and ignores the 
indignities that sexual minorities have suffered at the hands of 
religious exclusion. Yet again, the disparity of interest levels 
exists and is demonstrated by how Kennedy subordinates the 
interest of protecting sexual minorities beneath the interest for 
religious protections.  The passage potentially condones certain 
acts of religious animus against sexual minorities, placing 
exercise of religion over the protection of non-heteronormative 
sexual identities.  This priority exists even despite Kennedy’s 
observation of that protection for free exercise of religion must be 
“confined”;254 otherwise, a mass commercial refusal to provide 
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goods and services to sexual minorities might lead to “a 
community-wide stigma inconsistent with the history and 
dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure equal access to goods, 
services, and public accommodations.”255  But it also shows that 
there is enough room for Phillips to have validly refused Craig 
and Mullins.  In terms of dignity, this discussion implies a 
hierarchical limitation; sexual minorities deserve some 
constitutional protection based on their dignity, but not enough to 
surpass some instances of free religious exercise. This hierarchy 
resembles the Court’s prior reluctance to raise the lower-level 
scrutiny analysis of sexual minorities—even in cases featuring 
assimilated plaintiffs—such as in Windsor and reveals how the 
Court actually views sexual orientation as a protectable trait 
below other protectable identity traits.  Kennedy seems to signal 
that the Masterpiece couple could not confidently use their CADA 
sexual orientation discrimination claim to breakthrough to a 
fuller or higher treatment of formal equality for civil rights 
protections of sexual minorities in this federal forum.  Even when 
Phillips and his bakery clearly did not fall within the CADA 
religion exemption, his religious exercise rights conflict and ought 
to be noted substantially enough as if he deserved exemption.    
We see how Kennedy regards Phillips’ rights when he 
directly examines Phillips’ claim.  In examining Phillips’ account, 
Kennedy sides with Phillips on his distinction that creating a 
custom-ordered cake for Craig and Mullins would have used “his 
artistic skill to make an expressive statement, a wedding 
endorsement in [Phillips’] own voice and of his own creation.”256  
Here, Kennedy entwines both Phillips’ free speech and religious 
justifications for refusing Craig and Mullins and finds that 
“Phillips’ dilemma was particularly understandable given the 
background and legal principles and administration of the law in 
Colorado at that time” since Colorado had not yet recognized 
same-sex marriages when Phillips’ refusal occurred.257  In fact, 
Kennedy finds that  
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there is some force to the argument that the baker 
was not unreasonable in deeming it lawful to decline 
to take an action that he understood to be an 
expression of support for their validity when that 
expression was contrary to his sincerely held 
religious beliefs, at least insofar as his refusal was 
limited to refusing to create and express a message 
in support of gay marriage, even one planned to take 
place in another State.258 
Kennedy seems to suggest that had Phillips reluctantly agreed to 
create a cake for Craig and Mullins, this act would have severely 
violated a term so personal to Phillips because of his religious 
beliefs that the government would need to take notice.   He notes 
the three William Jack cake cases in which the Colorado Civil 
Rights Division found it was lawful for three bakers to have 
separately refused creating cakes that bore messages demeaning 
sexual minorities or same-sex marriages259 and noted that “[a]t 
the time, state law also afforded storekeepers some latitude to 
decline to create specific messages the storekeeper considered 
offensive.”260  All of his ruminations about the protections of 
sexual minorities and exercise of religious freedom culminates in 
qualifications that appear as if Kennedy is heavily posturing to 
preserve what results in the bottom line regarding Phillips’ 
actions—that ultimately despite the dignity and worth the Court 
has previously given to sexual minorities in the marriage equality 
cases, and despite how Phillips is not exempted from CADA here, 
formal equality for sexual minorities must give way to religious 
freedom.  Essentially the interest to protect sexual orientation 
from discrimination is not on equal footing as interest in 
protecting free exercise of religion.  Categorical denial of services 
and goods to sexual minorities based on a provider’s religious 
beliefs would not be condoned, of course; however, as Kennedy 
recognized, “Phillips was entitled to the neutral and respectful 
consideration of his claims in all the circumstances of the case.”261  
On Phillips’ behalf, Kennedy reaches extensively to comprehend 




261 Id. at 1729. 
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Phillips’ moral and religious dilemma, reading the case narrowly 
at the expense of diminishing the dignity and worth of Craig and 
Mullins.  Overall, Kennedy essentially embeds a plausible 
deniability favoring Phillips’ actions over the dignity of Craig and 
Mullins’ sexual identities.  Thus, he heavily prioritizes the 
interest to preserve the discriminatory status quo in order to curb 
the threat against it.   
3.  Religious Hostility       
 In truth, the tension between sexual orientation 
antidiscrimination versus religious freedom that Kennedy raises, 
explores, and then seemingly weighs in favor of Phillips never 
comes to an actual determination on the merits.  Kennedy never 
proclaims the actual doctrinal dividing line between Phillips’ 
religious objections to same-sex marriage and the protections of 
Craig and Mullins’ sexual identities from discrimination.  He 
never overrules CADA.  So his prioritization of interests to 
preserve the status quo is never given binding effect.  Within the 
factual contours of Masterpiece, Kennedy merely suggests that 
the interest to preserve the status quo outweighs the interest to 
protect Craig and Mullins’ sexual orientation from discrimination.  
On the substantive legal merits of Craig and Mullins’ 
discrimination claim, the formal equality aspects would reach a 
favorable outcome for the couple.  CADA had stood on the couple’s 
side.  Even Kennedy admits that CADA expressly forbid sexual 
orientation discrimination in the realm public accommodations.262  
Despite this, Kennedy effectuates preservation interest by 
examining the case procedurally to reverse the Court of Appeals.  
He reviews the public hearings on the matter by the Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission and reads into the record religious 
hostility displayed by members of the Commission sufficient for 
him to violate religious neutrality.263  Specifically, Kennedy 
focuses on remarks that disparage personal religious beliefs:   
At several points during its meeting, commissioners 
endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot 
legitimately be carried into the public sphere or 
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commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs 
and persons are less than fully welcome in 
Colorado’s business community.  One commissioner 
suggested that Phillips can believe “what he wants 
to believe,” but cannot act on his religious beliefs “if 
he decides to do business in the state.” . . . A few 
moments later, the commissioner restated the 
position: “[I]f a businessman wants to do business in 
the state and he’s got an issue with the—the law’s 
impacting his personal belief system, he needs to 
look at being able to comprise.”264    
Although Kennedy admits that such statements could be 
construed differently, he finds such comments are “more likely” 
hostile toward Phillips.265  He is convinced of observing more 
religious hostility made at a later Commission public hearing that 
furthered the animosity toward Phillips’ religious views.266  
Kennedy heavy-handedly compounds the Commission’s previous 
statements he excerpted with a particular Commission member’s 
individual quote criticizing societal uses of religion for advancing 
discriminatory ends throughout human history—for instance, 
justifying slavery or the Holocaust.267  That Commission 
member’s quote had ended on a personal tone, which Kennedy 
expressly interprets as a disparagement that effectuated the 
Commission’s alleged hostility to Phillips—that calling his 
religious views “despicable” and contextualizing them as rhetoric 
for advancing discrimination belittled and dehumanized such 
views and actions.268  Although Kennedy does not expressly use 
“dignity” rhetoric here in these passages, he employs these 
remote excerpts from the Commission’s extensive hearings and 
review to draw conclusions that such remarks about Phillips’ 
religious views and acts ultimately demeaned Phillips.  All in all, 
Kennedy surmises that the Commission’s remarks had suggested 
“that religious beliefs and persons are less than fully welcome in 
Colorado’s business community”; could be seen as “inappropriate 
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and dismissive comments showing lack of due consideration for 
Phillips’ free exercise rights and the dilemma he faced”; and had 
“disparaged [Phillips’] religion” in ways that characterized it as 
“despicable,” and “something insubstantial and even insincere.”269  
Even without expressly using the word “dignity” here, Kennedy 
tries to convince us that the Commission’s criticisms and 
observations of Phillips’ “sincerely held religious beliefs” 270 were 
a kind of hostility that violated Phillips’ personhood in some way.  
Kennedy’s repeated characterizations of Phillips’ religious 
motivations as “sincere” imply that Phillips was being genuine 
and truthful about his religious beliefs. It also suggests that 
Phillips’ actions against Craig and Mullins were somehow 
blameless—that his refusal was somehow naturally justified 
because they were backed by “sincere” religious beliefs against 
same-sex marriages and that Phillips could not help himself from 
acting inconsistently with his beliefs.  As such, Kennedy again 
views Phillips’ religiously-motived actions of sexual orientation 
discrimination with a plausible deniability in favor of Phillips.  
Because Phillips’ religiously-motived actions are backed by 
“sincere” religious beliefs, the Commission’s public remarks on 
record about Phillips’ exercise of religion—and the lack of 
objections to these remarks at the hearings and in later appellate 
review271—would always be taken as hostile, inappropriate, and 
disparaging to Phillips’ personal character.  In this way, Kennedy 
moralizes and nearly essentializes Phillips’ religious identity.  He 
dignifies Phillips.  This reasoning pantomimes the kind of dignity 
rhetoric Kennedy had used in Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell 
to show respectively how anti-sodomy laws, DOMA, and exclusion 
to marriage all demeaned the identities of same-sex couples. He 
ushers in such indication because the type of religious freedom 
Phillips subscribes to, after all, is within the dominant status quo.  
To Kennedy, the dignity in Phillips’ religious identity 
unquestionably exists, and so it must be that his beliefs are 
“sincere.”  
 This sense that Kennedy is not merely defending Phillips’ 
religious views, but Phillips’ dignity is even furthered by his 
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comparisons between the Commission’s prior decisions in three 
other Colorado cases where bakers had refused a customer who 
had requested cakes that would have conveyed derogatory and 
hateful messages about same-sex marriages.272  Those bakers had 
won their cases and lawfully legitimized their refusals before the 
Commission on the basis of conscience.273  Comparing those cake 
cases to the present one before the Court, Kennedy finds that “the 
Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ religious objection did not 
accord with its treatment of these other objections.”274  To 
perpetuate another example that the Commission had shown 
religious hostility toward Phillips, Kennedy sides with Phillips’ 
view that “this disparity in treatment reflected hostility on the 
part of the Commission toward his beliefs.”275  In doing so, 
Kennedy implies that the Commission had treated the conscience-
based objections in the other cake cases as legitimate because the 
Commission had equated designing a custom cake with 
derogatory messages as an endorsement of that message; 
meanwhile Kennedy finds the Commission’s treatment of 
Phillips’s objection, and the Court of Appeals’ later disregard of 
the comparison, both ignored a similar logic that baking Craig 
and Mullins’ cake signified for Phillips as an endorsement of 
same-sex marriage, which would violate his religious beliefs.276  
One could draw from Kennedy’s comparison that Phillips’ 
compliance with Craig and Mullins’ request would have been such 
a violation of Phillips’ genuine religious sentiments against same-
sex marriage by becoming an endorsement adverse to his own 
religious character—and by extension, to his religious identity.  
In essence, by making that cake for Craig and Mullins, he would 
be endorsing something that he did not believe in—so much so 
that he could not even go along with it without it becoming 
personal.  Again, therein lies the hostility, according to 
Kennedy.277  One could argue that Kennedy was not merely 
defending Phillips’ sincerely-held religious beliefs here but also 
defending Phillips’ religious identity.    
                                                 
272 Id. at 1730. 
273 Id.  
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. at 1730-31. 
277 Id. at 1731. 
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4.  Speciousness and Questions of Motives 
Kennedy’s religious hostility findings against Phillips 
become specious and thin when his version of the Commission’s 
lack of neutrality competes with the versions expounded in his 
colleagues’ concurrences and dissents.  Whether the other 
Justices have found lesser, deeper, or no violations of religious 
neutrality, disagreement exists over both the Commission’s 
remarks toward Phillips’ religiously-motivated refusal and the 
handling of the William Jack cake cases below.  Such 
disagreement calls into question the substance of Kennedy’s 
religious hostility findings and illustrates the desperate attempt 
to preserve the status quo.   
Although in agreement with the majority’s overall ruling in 
Masterpiece that religious hostility existed in lower proceedings, 
Justice Kagan, with Justice Breyer joining, offers a lesser degree 
of religious hostility in her concurrence.  She suggests that the 
Commission and the Court of Appeals’ regard for the different 
results between the Masterpiece case here and the three other 
Colorado cake cases was legally justified and not a sign of 
religious hostility.278  In her view, the different regard between 
those cake refusals and Phillips’ hinged on factual interpretation:  
“[I]n refusing that request, the bakers did not single out Jack 
because of his religion, but instead treated him the same way 
they would have treated anyone else—just as CADA requires.  By 
contrast, the same-sex couple in this case requested a wedding 
cake that Phillips would have made for an opposite-sex couple.”279  
Such refusal violated CADA’s public accommodations protections 
against sexual orientation discrimination.280  In that way, “[t]he 
different outcomes in the Jack cases and the Phillips case could 
thus have been justified by a plain reading and neutral 
application of Colorado law—untainted by any bias against a 
religious belief.”281  Kagan only agrees with Kennedy’s majority 
that the views and sentiments of the Commission members at the 
public hearings were religiously hostile, and thus, her version of 
                                                 
278 Id. at 1733-34 (Kagan & Breyer, JJ., concurring). 
279 Id. at 1733. 
280 Id. 
281 Id.  
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religious hostility—though it exists enough in this case for her to 
join in the Court’s reversal—seems less severe.       
 Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito, concurs by re-
examining on his own terms the Commission’s treatment of the 
other Colorado bakers’ refusals in those three cake cases and 
Phillips.’  While Kagan had rendered that the cake that Craig and 
Mullins had requested from Phillips was a wedding cake, Gorsuch 
interprets that what Craig and Mullins had asked for was “a cake 
celebrating a same-sex wedding.”282  This interpretation allows 
Gorsuch to read the fact patterns of the William Jack cake cases 
and Masterpiece similarly and question the Commission’s and 
Court of Appeals’ distinguishing of those cases from Phillips.’  If 
the bakers were legally allowed to refuse Mr. Jack’s requests for 
cakes that denigrated same-sex weddings because the messages 
were morally offensive to the bakers, then Phillips should have 
been able to refuse Craig and Mullins’ request for a cake 
celebrating a same-sex wedding because same-sex marriages was 
religiously repugnant to Phillips.283  As he sees it, “[i]n both cases, 
it was the kind of cake, not the kind of customer, that mattered to 
the bakers”284 and that “[t]he problem here is that the 
Commission failed to act neutrally by applying a consistent legal 
rule.”285  Gorsuch heightens that disparity with deeper analysis 
than Kennedy does.  But to see the cake as one that particularly 
celebrates a same-sex wedding or marriage resembles the “special 
rights” rhetoric that conservative opponents had lodged against 
gay rights movement initiatives in the past.  In this way, 
Gorsuch’s deeper analysis engenders more animosity toward the 
couple than Kennedy’s.   
 Likewise, Justice Thomas’ concurrence, joined by Gorsuch, 
also seemed to deepen the religious hostility findings.  Unlike 
Gorsuch or Kagan, his concurrence focused exclusively on the free 
speech claim that Kennedy had left unexplored in the majority 
opinion.286  Because Phillips refused Craig and Mullins on the 
                                                 
282 Id. at 1735 (Gorsuch & Alito, JJ., concurring). 
283 Id. at 1735-36. 
284 Id. at 1736. 
285 Id.  
286 Id. at 1740 (Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment).  
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grounds that he was religiously opposed to same-sex marriage, 
his act of refusal, which Thomas analyzes as speech, is invariably 
entwined with religion.  First, Thomas finds that for Phillips the 
design and creation of custom wedding cakes is expressive enough 
to qualify as speech.287  In addition, Thomas finds that wedding 
cakes themselves are highly symbolic, which further heightens 
the expressiveness of creating them.288  Thus, the act of creating 
wedding cakes for Phillips is an expressive one for speech 
protection.289  As such, Thomas regards Craig and Mullins’ 
request as one that asked Phillips to create a cake for a same-sex 
wedding and sought endorsement with the couple’s speech—not 
his.290  Thomas’ rationale here amplifies Phillips’ personal 
endorsement when he creates a wedding cake—“Colorado is 
requiring Phillips to be ‘intimately connected’ with the couple’s 
speech”—and thus his First Amendment speech protections 
arise.291  Such speech would be antithetical to Phillips’ religious 
identity, and Thomas demonstrates this by drawing out Phillips’ 
religious nature.292  To add to this free speech violation to 
Kennedy’s analysis deepens the findings of religious hostility in 
the majority opinion.        
 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice 
Sotomayor, completely disagrees with her colleagues’ finding of 
religious hostility and she would have affirmed the ruling below 
that Phillips’ refusal amounted to sexual orientation 
discrimination against Craig and Mullins.293 She contests the 
majority’s finding of religious hostility.294  First, she sides with 
Kagan’s view that the Masterpiece cake was a wedding cake and 
not a cake that had special meaning attributed to the baker.295  
Predictably, this take on the cake leads to the finding that Kagan 
had asserted in comparing and ultimately contrasting Phillips’ 
refusal with the refusal of other Colorado bakers for requests to 
                                                 
287 Id. at 1742. 
288 Id. at 1743. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. at n. 3. 
291 Id. at 1743 n. 3. 
292 Id. at 1745. 
293 Id. at 1752 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). 
294 See id. at 1748-49. 
295 Id. at 1748 n. 1. 
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bake cakes with anti-gay messages: “The different outcomes the 
Court features do not evidence hostility to religion of the kind we 
have previously held to signal a free-exercise violation.”296  This 
rendering would contradict one of Kennedy’s two reasons for 
finding religious hostility.  In Ginsburg’s opinion, she argues 
against Gorsuch’s view that the case is about the kind of cake and 
not the identity of the parties.  Rather, “[w]hat matters is that 
Phillips would not provide a good or service to a same-sex couple 
that he would provide to a heterosexual couple.”297  This reading 
reveals her perspective that the cake was a wedding cake and not 
a cake with a pro-marriage equality message:  “When a couple 
contacts a bakery for a wedding cake, the product they are 
seeking is a cake celebrating their wedding—not a cake 
celebrating heterosexual weddings or same-sex weddings—and 
that is the service Craig and Mullins were denied.”298  The reason 
for that denial, as Ginsburg surmises, is Craig and Mullins’ 
sexual orientation.299   
 Ginsburg also firmly contradicts Kennedy’s other reason 
for finding religious hostility, which regarded certain Commission 
members’ remarks as intolerant of Phillips’ religious views.  Just 
as the treatment of the other Colorado cake cases with Phillips’ 
refusal should not have prompted a reversal based on religious 
hostility, “nor do the comments by one or two members of one of 
the four decisionmaking entities considering this case justify 
reversing the judgment below.”300  In her perspective, “[w]hatever 
one may think of the statements in historical context, I see no 
reason why the comments of one or two Commissioners should be 
taken to overcome Phillips’ refusal to see a wedding cake to Craig 
and Mullins.”301  To support her view here, she observed that the 
lower proceedings also “involved several layers of independent 
decisionmaking, of which the Commission was but one” and 
narrated four stages of rulings in Colorado before the case 
reached the Supreme Court.302  Such layers of adjudication make 
                                                 
296 Id. at 1749. 
297 Id. at 1750. 
298 Id. 
299 Id. 
300 Id. at 1749. 
301 Id. at 1751. 
302 Id. 
2019]                           QUEER SACRIFICE                                    57 
 
 
Forthcoming, to be published in the Yale Journal of Law & Feminism. 
Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission. 
Kennedy’s findings of religious hostility questionable and 
hollow.303  According to Ginsburg, even the Court’s prior 
precedent on religious neutrality, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. v. Hialeah, “implicated a sole decisionmaking body” and not 
the kind of proceedings on below in Masterpiece.304  She would 
have completely rendered an opposite opinion had she penned the 
majority ruling.   
 Taken altogether, the differences amongst Masterpiece’s 
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions over the existence, 
intensity, and non-existence of religious hostility against Phillips 
seems to suggest that the religious hostility issue was a tenuous 
one to consider.  Did religious hostility exist in both the 
Commission member’s remarks against Phillips’ religious views 
and how the Commission distinguished Phillips’s refusal in 
Masterpiece from the bakers’ refusals in the William Jack cases, 
as Kennedy argues in the majority?  Or did religious hostility only 
exist in the remarks and not in the way Kennedy or Gorsuch read 
the Commission’s distinguishing of the other cake case, as Kagan 
writes in her concurrence?  Did it arise within the free speech 
violation as well, as Thomas seems to suggest?  Was the religious 
hostility more intense and more pernicious than Kennedy’s 
majority suggest, as Gorsuch tries to demonstrate in his 
reconciliation of the William Jack cake cases and Masterpiece?  Or 
did neither the remarks nor the Commissions’ distinguishing of 
the William Jack cake cases from Masterpiece amount to any 
religious hostility in the lower proceedings, as Ginsburg tries to 
prove?  There is no consensus, revealing that the Court’s review 
of general applicability in Masterpiece is thin and potentially 
specious.  Perhaps enough religious hostility exists or not.  It 
suggests the possibility that the Court’s rendering was not quite 
accurate, but instead it was the best argument to make in light of 
stronger, more definite facts that sexual orientation 
discrimination did occur under CADA when Phillips refused to 
fulfill Craig and Mullins’ request.  And that best argument—
religious hostility that violates general applicability—is a 
contentious and debatable one, at best.  That emphatic urgency in 
Masterpiece to stick with such a questionable argument as the 
                                                 
303 Id. 
304 Id. at 1751-52. 
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crux to overturning the prior state court ruling of sexual 
orientation discrimination possibly reveals a tension—even with 
some of the non-conservative justices—for finding sexual 
orientation as a trait worthy of fuller protections, even after 
Obergefell.  Or it could exemplify the Justices’ tension with the 
kind of sexual minority litigants this time before the Court.  In 
essence, the Court seems to articulate a higher interest in 
preserving a discriminatory status quo over affirming an instance 
of sexual orientation anti-discrimination.  Sexual orientation as a 
protectable trait against discrimination reached some progress in 
Obergefell, but never at the kind of heightened scrutiny 
protections that race or gender has received.  And that limited 
progress is definitely underscored by the interests the Court 
anxiously engenders around religious freedom in this sexual 
orientation discrimination case.   
 The instability of the religious hostility argument amongst 
Justices of the Masterpiece Court, hence, raises questions of 
motives.  The case’s resolution through Kennedy’s majority 
opinion depends on the Justices’ review of the procedural aspects 
of the lower proceedings in order to dispense with the task of 
determining the couple’s sexual orientation discrimination claim 
under CADA.  That strategic reliance on procedure forecloses any 
substantive review between Craig and Mullins’ anti-
discrimination interests and Phillips’ religious interests—a 
substantive review that could have sided in favor of the couple as 
the Commission and the Court of Appeals exhibited strong 
findings of discrimination in their CADA reviews.  Not to 
mention, the Court’s review of the procedures on below is directly 
related to Phillips’ religion—directly attached to interests in 
preserving a discriminatory status quo though religious freedom.  
Consequently, the Court highlights the interests of the status quo 
preservation over protecting sexual minorities—here, sexual 
minorities who showed little resemblance to the assimilated 
sexual minorities in Obergefell.  Of course, it will be unknown, 
given the way the Court handled its decision to reverse 
Masterpiece, whether Craig and Mullins would have prevailed 
here had they exhibited more of the same traits that the plaintiffs 
from the marriage equality cases had exhibited.  However, in 
terms of sexual orientation, one view remains evident from 
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Masterpiece.  When confronted with religion—even in the context 
of marriage—queer sexual identities rather than assimilated ones 
engender much less deference with the Court.  In Masterpiece, the 
Court’s conception of sexual orientation anti-discrimination at 
this time very likely does not include protection of less 
assimilated, less mainstream sexual minorities.     
Indeed, the primacy that Kennedy gives to protecting 
Phillips’ exercise of religion is so paramount that it makes 
deference to religion seem circuitous and difficult to critique.  
After all, acts of discrimination are often harbored from some 
forms of animus.305  In pinpointing discrimination, drawing such 
motives help to establish that an act of discrimination occurred.  
However, because Kennedy finds that even the Commission’s 
comparison remark about the historical use of religion to advance 
discrimination had tarnished Phillips’ religious identity rather 
than serve to constructively demonstrate religiously-motivated 
discrimination, future adjudicating bodies must tread very 
carefully when their fair and neutral application of laws are 
prompted in religion cases.  Such perspective on the Court’s 
finding of religious hostility has scholarly support.  According to 
Leslie Kendrick and Micah Swartzman,  
[i]n Masterpiece, the Court mistook the neutral 
application of civil rights law for what Justice Scalia 
once called a “fit of spite.”  The Commission's 
decision to deny Phillips a religious exemption was 
not the product of religious hostility, but rather a 
good faith effort to interpret and apply CADA, which 
forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation in public accommodations.  In holding 
that the Commission failed to treat Phillips’s claims 
with neutrality and respect, the Court improperly 
applied free exercise doctrine to the facts of the case, 
finding unconstitutional hostility and intolerance 
where there were none.306  
                                                 
305 E.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
306 Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. 
L. REV. 133, 145 (2018). 
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Correspondingly, the effect of Masterpiece, in regards to future 
application of neutrality, seems unclear according to John Inazu: 
"The [Masterpiece Court’s] jurisprudence means that we’re going 
to have state-by-state norms that vary quite a bit . . .  about what 
counts as protections for religious freedom.”307  These comments 
and the different versions (or in Ginsburg’s case, non-version) of 
religious hostility render Kennedy’s finding and use of religious 
hostility in the majority opinion shaky.  Indirectly, it could 
exhibit the Court’s hasty anxiety to prioritize the interest to 
protect religious freedom within a discriminatory status quo over 
interest to promote sexual orientation anti-discrimination.  It 
serves as another possible sign of failure to satisfy the requisite 
interest convergence needed for Craig and Mullins’ success.    
All of this demonstrates the heightened interest the Court 
gives to preserving a discriminatory status quo in Masterpiece.  
Not only does Kennedy prioritize the interest toward protecting 
religious freedoms more heavily than the interest in protecting 
against sexual orientation discrimination, but he then 
demonstrates how paramount that interest is—in fact, he 
reinforces it—when he reverses the sexual orientation 
discrimination ruling on procedural grounds that the Colorado 
proceedings did not sufficiently respect Phillips’ “sincere” 
religious beliefs.308  At the end of the Court’s majority opinion, 
even despite Colorado’s interest in protecting sexual orientation 
discrimination as CADA articulates and despite the state’s 
adjudicated findings that Phillips’ refusal was sexual orientation 
discrimination against Craig and Mullins, this interest in 
preserving a discriminatory status quo stands strong and 
towering.  But in reaching that towering fortification, Kennedy 
and the concurring Justices seem to have offered an unsatisfying 
finding of religious hostility.  It belies a deep, pernicious sense of 
queer anxiety against Craig and Mullins fueled by a perception 
that the status quo was threatened.          
                                                 
307 Tom Gjelten, Court Sees 'Hostility' To Religious Beliefs In Case Of Baker 
And Same-Sex Couple, NPR (Jun. 5, 2018) 
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/05/617029562/colorado-bakers-supreme-court-
win-revives-religious-freedom-debate. 
308 138 S. Ct. at 1731. 
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D.  QUEER SACRIFICE 
 Speciousness and anxiousness in the Court’s religious 
hostility finding leaves a frustrating regard for Kennedy’s 
opinion.  Can such a dubious reasoning undo what had been a 
strong showing of sexual orientation discrimination under CADA?  
Craig and Mullins was refused service and goods because of their 
sexual orientation.  Phillips was not exempt under CADA’s 
religious exception.  However, looking at the case through 
interest convergence theory, the ruling makes more sense 
psychologically because, although the law stands thinly, the 
motives are clear.  Under the Court’s perception, Craig and 
Mullins likely threatened the status quo.    
But if the only conclusion drawn from observing the lack of 
interest convergence in Masterpiece is that dominant 
authorities—i.e. the Supreme Court—are reluctant to protect less 
unassimilated sexual minorities, then merely noticing the 
absence of converging interests would be a limiting feat.  The 
utility of seeing Derrick Bell’s interest convergence theory 
demonstrated in the context of gay rights would be constrained as 
well—like the Court’s majority decision, only half-baked.  Further 
significance exists in observing that the Court’s interest in 
preserving a discriminatory status quo had outweighed any 
interest toward protecting sexual minorities, such as Craig and 
Mullins, from religious discrimination.  What Masterpiece 
actually demonstrates is not merely that Bell’s interest 
convergence thesis exists in the gay movement’s progression, but 
what Anthony Kreis had identified when he applied Bell’s 
interest convergence thesis as a predictive model for future gay 
rights advancements.  He had reiterated Bell’s thesis of 
involuntary sacrifice in the sexual minority context—a theory 
Bell called “racial sacrifice” that compliments interest 
convergence thesis to form what Bell referred to as “racial 
fortuity.”309   In writing several years before Obergefell and 
Masterpiece, Kreis was right to import Bell’s racial sacrifice thesis 
here.  Masterpiece’s misalignment of interests—its lack of interest 
                                                 
309 Kreis, supra n. __, at 121-22; Derrick Bell, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 69 
(2004) [hereinafter Bell, SILENT COVENANTS]. 
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convergence—resembles that involuntary sacrifice.  Indeed as the 
following explains, Masterpiece is an instance of queer sacrifice.  
1.  Bell’s Theory 
 For Bell, interest convergence helped clarify why the Court 
in Brown v. Board of Education had the opportunity to overturn 
its previous segregation holding in Plessy v. Ferguson.310  The 
theory offered a predictive mechanism for exploring when 
dominant powers would ever accommodate marginalized groups.  
Yet, interest convergence is merely one piece of Bell’s later theory 
of racial fortuity.  In the context of that racial fortuity theory, 
interest convergence is merely one variable that is complimented 
by another theory:  racial sacrifice.  Within the struggles to 
overcome racial inequality, Bell defined racial sacrifice as the way 
“the society is always willing to sacrifice the rights of black people 
in order to protect important economic or political interests of 
whites.”311  Bell later reiterated racial sacrifice as a predictive 
moniker—in the inverse logic of interest convergence—to expect 
when the white dominant power will decide not to weld their 
authority for legal and political change that would help advance 
interests of marginalized racial groups, such as African-
Americans: “Even when interest-convergence results in an 
effective racial remedy, that remedy will be abrogated at the point 
that policymakers fear the remedial policy is threatening the 
superior societal status of whites, particularly those in the middle 
and upper classes.”312  Both interest convergence and racial 
sacrifice are “two sides of the same coin.  The two-sided coin, with 
involuntary racial sacrifice on the one side and interest-
convergent remedies on the other, can be referred to as racial 
fortuity.”313  Consequently, Bell conceptualizes the underpinnings 
of racial progress through “racial fortuity,” which are animated by 
instances of interest convergence and racial sacrifice.314  And if 
                                                 
310 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
311 Derrick Bell, “Here Come De Judge”: The Role of Faith in Progressive 
Decision-Making, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 8 (1999) [hereinafter Bell, “Here Come 
De Judge”]. 
312 Bell, SILENT COVENANTS, supra n. __, at 69. 
313 Id. 
314 Kathleen A. Bergin, Mixed Motives: Regarding Race and Racial Fortuity, 23 
CONST. COMMENT. 271, 274 (2006). 
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one views racial fortuity as the way American society has 
achieved racial justice, then one would assume very 
pessimistically that racial justice occurs not through “hard-earned 
entitlement” but is “pre-ordained” through this mechanism of 
racial fortuity plotted by converging interests and racial sacrifice, 
alternating side-by-side.315  
Bell noticed examples of involuntary racial sacrifice in 
several American historical moments.  For example, he saw racial 
sacrifice during the original drafting of the Constitution when 
slavery was protected to bolster slave owner support for the 
document.316   Bell also considered the Hayes-Tilden Compromise 
in 1877 that staved off resurgence of the Civil War as racial 
sacrifice at the expense of the rights of Southern blacks.317  As a 
third example, he also saw racial sacrifice in the way that the 
Court in Plessy constitutionally permitted segregation as a way to 
engender white support for existing economic policies that were 
not favoring white people.318  
Within the school desegregation era after Brown, Bell 
adopted the view that white resistance to desegregation lingered 
long after the landmark decision, which affected implementation 
of desegregation but that decision itself had left room for white 
resistance through its subtle deference to Southern whites.319  
Kathleen Bergin, in her study of Bell’s racial fortuity theory, 
concentrates on this observation as a way that the Brown 
eventually led to racial sacrifice:    
The seeds of racial sacrifice were planted even prior 
to the announcement of Brown, when a number of 
Justices voiced concern during the Court's judicial 
conferences for the impact desegregation would have 
on Whites. No matter how irrational “prosegregation 
emotion,” Justice Jackson wrote, “we can hardly deny 
the existence of sincerity and passion of those who 
think that their blood, birth and lineage are 
                                                 
315 Bell, SILENT COVENANTS, supra n. __, at 9. 
316 Bell, “Here Come De Judge,” supra n. __, at 8. 
317 Id.  
318 Id. at 8-9. 
319 Bell, SILENT COVENANTS, supra n. __, at 95. 
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something worthy of protection by separatism.” 
Justice Reed was even more solicitous, urging the 
Court to “start with the idea that there is a large and 
reasonable body of opinion in various states that 
separation of the races is for the benefit of both.” The 
record suggests that several Justices agreed to strike 
down segregation on the condition that Chief Justice 
Warren draft an opinion that did not require 
immediate implementation from the South.320 
In tone, the passages of Justices Robert Jackson and Stanley 
Reed on the Brown Court sharply resemble the deference that 
Kennedy gave in Obergefell to those who opposed same-sex 
marriages, whom he characterized as acting “in good faith” in 
their religious belief and “reasonable and sincere.”321  In 
Masterpiece, sincerely-held religious antipathy toward same-sex 
marriages became the focus of defense by the majority.  In 
addition, Bergin observes that in implementing Brown, the 
Court’s “all deliberate speed” standard for schools to comply with 
desegregation left some directives unclear:   
The [Brown] decree instructed local school boards to 
make a “prompt and reasonable start” towards full 
desegregation, but district courts charged with 
monitoring compliance were never told when 
desegregation should begin, when it should end, or 
what pace of progress to demand in between. They 
were instead instructed to move cautiously and 
authorized to interrupt a desegregation plan once it 
began if circumstances warranted “additional time.” 
The Justices hoped this cooling off period would 
induce voluntary compliance from the South, but 
only prolonged delay by relinquishing oversight to 
“the most recalcitrant judge and the most defiant 
school board.”322 
                                                 
320 Bergin, supra n. __, at 285. 
321 135 S. Ct. at 2594. 
322 Bergin, supra n. __, at 285. 
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By analogy, the Obergefell Court mandated marriage equality by 
state courts, but left the contours of implementations vague—
especially the tensions with religious freedom—which led to 
resistance immediately after the decision with local clerks 
refusing to issue marriage licenses323 and judges who tried to 
disobey the ruling,324   
To further hone in on her observation of racial sacrifice in 
the desegregation era, Bergin observes that “[i]mmediately after 
Brown, the Court let stand a series of district court judgments 
that distinguished between ‘integration’ and ‘desegregation’ by 
recognizing a right of White school children to avoid compulsory 
integration with Blacks.”325  Lower courts followed suit and 
eventually “[t]he distinction between ‘desegregation’ and 
‘integration’ established in these cases led to the proliferation of 
‘freedom of choice’ plans, transfer provisions and other measures 
that maintained actual segregation while purporting to comply 
with Brown.”326  Here it is not difficult to compare Bergin’s 
identification of racial sacrifice post-Brown and the Obergefell 
Court’s deference to religious beliefs to the Masterpiece Court’s 
use of religious exercise to foreclose sexual orientation 
antidiscrimination.  Between Bell and Bergin, their post-Brown 
observations of racial sacrifice resemble the homophobic reactions 
after Obergefell and stalled progress in Masterpiece. 
2. Queering Bell’s Theory in Masterpiece 
    If one can conclude that interest convergence did occur in 
Obergefell and in other gay rights decisions327—then it is also 
possible to apply the rest of Bell’s thesis toward interpreting the 
mechanism of advancements in justice for sexual minorities.  If 
                                                 
323 E.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kentucky Clerk Defies Court on Marriage Licenses 
for Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/us/kentucky-rowan-county-same-sex-
marriage-licenses-kim-davis.html. 
324 E.g., Campbell Robertson, Roy Moore, Alabama Judge, Suspended Over Gay 
Marriage Stance, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/us/judge-roy-moore-alabama-same-sex-
marriage.html. 
325 Bergin, supra n. __, at 286. 
326 Id. at 286. 
327 See Khuu, supra n. __, at 214-24; see also Kreis, supra n. __, at 142-51. 
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Obergefell signified interest convergence, then Masterpiece with 
its lack of converging interests could stand an example of the kind 
of involuntary sacrifice akin to what Bell and Bergin pegged as 
racial sacrifice post-Brown—only here perhaps what the 
Masterpiece decision represents is a moment of “queer sacrifice.”      
 To reiterate the definition of racial sacrifice, Bell’s own 
pronouncement is used:  “Even when interest-convergence results 
in an effective racial remedy, that remedy will be abrogated at the 
point that policymakers fear the remedial policy is threatening 
the superior societal status of whites, particularly those in the 
middle and upper classes.”328  Bell’s theory is applicable to 
Masterpiece.  At the start of the case, the effective remedy 
available to sexual minorities against sexual orientation 
discrimination was Colorado’s public accommodations law.329  
CADA’s inclusion of sexual orientation likely resulted in interest 
convergence at the state level, since that category was not always 
included in the act. As Kennedy even notes in Masterpiece, 
CADA’s protection of sexual minorities against discrimination in 
places of public accommodation was an addition made in 2007 
and 2008.330  Prior to this amendment, sexual orientation had 
been an absent trait for CADA protection.  In this way, the 
Colorado state legislature’s later addition to include sexual 
orientation as a protected class within its state antidiscrimination 
law was likely an instance of interest convergence that resulted in 
a remedy for protecting sexual minorities.331 This specific 
instance of interest convergence could have been facilitated also 
by the Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans in 1996, striking down 
Colorado’s Amendment 2, which specifically denied protections for 
sexual orientation discrimination.332  In addition, since 
Masterpiece was following the Court’s marriage equality decision 
in Obergefell, an interpretation could also be made that interest 
convergence could have contributed to another effective remedy 
for sexual minorities here, even though the facts of Masterpiece 
                                                 
328 Bell, SILENT COVENANTS, supra n. __, at 69. 
329 Colo. Rev. Stat. §24-34-605 (2017). 
330 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1725. 
331 See Matt Simonsen, Master File, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm., __ U.S. __ (2017): Legislative History of SB08-200 (Sept. 23, 
2017), http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/research-data/8/. 
332 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996). 
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pre-dated the Obergefell decision.  The references to Obergefell in 
respondents’ briefs could reasonably allow such an inference; 
Craig and Mullins were trying to use Obergefell to leverage the 
outcome of their case.333  Thus, likely the Court’s own interest 
convergence in Romer and Obergefell influenced the available 
relief at this judicial level of review.  In other words, the couple 
had CADA on their side—especially after the lower proceedings.  
But they were also following Obergefell directly, and had Romer 
in the remote shadows.  Alternatively, one could plausibly read 
CADA as the only remedial relief available for Craig and Mullins 
or respectively use Obergefell to that same effect—hence the 
various starting points for grafting Bell’s theory of racial sacrifice 
onto Masterpiece.  However, because Masterpiece was a Supreme 
Court decision reviewing CADA, a conflation of both CADA and 
prior Supreme Court gay rights cases seems more appropriate for 
satisfying the extension of Bell’s sacrifice theory here. 
 From here, it is possible to read into Masterpiece the effect 
that Craig and Mullins’ less-assimilated, destabilizing sexual 
identities had toward producing the Court’s reversal of their 
successful CADA discrimination claim against the religious 
baker, Phillips.  Borrowing Bell’s description of racial fortuity, 
conditions that had been fortuitous for marriage equality and 
same-sex couples in the Obergefell case were now changed in 
Masterpiece.334  As discussed above, the Masterpiece couple did 
not embody the assimilated traits of the Obergefell plaintiffs and 
they did not share perceived mainstream American 
characteristics or demographics, nor did they seem similar to the 
identities of the Justices themselves.  Instead, their queer 
identities deemed them more like outsiders to either the 
American mainstream or elite, assimilated gay populations.  
Instead of fitting in with perceived heteronormative ideals of 
family and gender roles, Craig and Mullins played with 
androgyny and repeatedly displayed their sexuality in public for 
the media to harness.  They did not have family-oriented 
obligations such as childrearing.  When they should have been 
more politically quiet, they did not relent.  They did not present 
themselves as having respectable jobs or careers.  Outside of 
                                                 
333 Brief for Respondents, supra n. __, at 1-2, 42-43. 
334 Bell, SILENT COVENANTS, supra n. __, at 9. 
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traditional dominant ideas about gender, family, and 
respectability, they appeared threatening to the heteronormative 
status quo in ways that the Obergefell plaintiffs had not. Their 
perceived non-conformity cost them.   
 Moreover, their discrimination claim involved religious 
beliefs that reaffirmed the dominant, heteronormative status 
quo—specifically Christian beliefs against same-sex marriages 
held by a deeply-religious merchant.  In following Bell’s theory of 
racial sacrifice, it might be possible enough for queer sacrifice to 
take place when the facts present a sexual orientation 
discrimination suit filed by a same-sex couple whose destabilizing 
sexual identities threaten the status quo more than other 
assimilated same-sex couples would.  However, what could seem 
even more threatening to the Court was how that sexual 
orientation discrimination suit by this non-conforming queer 
couple directly confronted religion through a moment of Christian 
antipathy toward same-sex marriages.  This direct confrontation 
with religion offered the tipping point to which the Court 
responded by reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision favoring 
the couple, not by finding fault with the CADA claim itself but 
through a questionable finding of religious hostility with the 
lower proceedings.  It could be likely that the Court’s protection of 
religion—thus reflecting its interest in protecting the 
heteronormative status quo—was provoked by anxiety over 
having to protect queerness under CADA, even if marriage 
equality legally existed.  The reversal in Masterpiece seemed 
likely as an abrogation of effective remedies under CADA because 
otherwise the couple’s use of remedies under CADA would 
somehow threaten the dominant group.  It would have led to an 
acknowledgement of their queerness. 
 Accordingly, Masterpiece extends of Bell’s racial sacrifice 
theory—but as an instance of queer sacrifice.  If interest 
convergence has already been observed in other moments within  
the LGTBQ movement, then one could plausibly read instances in 
which sexual minorities did not prevail, such as Masterpiece here, 
as queer sacrifice within a similar—perhaps, identical—
mechanism of sexual minority justice similar to Bell’s theory of 
racial fortuity.  Only here, we have queer fortuity instead of racial 
fortuity.  Precisely in this comparison, examples of interest 
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convergence and queer sacrifice could also animate advances for 
sexual minorities consonant with how Bell’s thesis offers specific 
strategies against the mechanisms of subordination and injustice 
in the racial justice context.  As much as this Part III has shown 
that Bell’s thesis has been appropriate for explaining Masterpiece, 
his thesis can also guide forward.  Part IV explores such 
possibilities. 
IV.  QUEER FORTUITY 
At first glance, the Masterpiece decision ought to engender 
various levels of pessimism for sexual minorities in the post-
marriage equality era.  From Part III’s discussion, the decision 
reveals significant limits with the level of formal legal equality 
that assimilated same-sex couples had received in Obergefell.  
Masterpiece illustrates the constraints of both marriage rights 
and sameness arguments, and exhibits the lengths at which the 
Court will take to preserve a discriminatory status quo in light of 
protecting sexual minorities who appear less mainstream.  This 
result is so even when Craig and Mullins had an effective legal 
remedy to secure under CADA.  Legal commentators have drawn 
multiple conclusions about the case depending on each 
commentator’s the level of pessimism.  Some regard the decision 
as narrow; while others disagree.335  But by applying Bell’s 
theory, this Article has argued that Masterpiece was a setback for 
the gay movement—a movement that has by now largely shifted 
away from employing grassroots liberationist tactics pinned on 
transforming existing hegemony to more assimilative strategies 
rooted in identity politics and single-issue causes that are often 
more salient to what matters to the elite-tier demographic of the 
sexual minority population. 
A. CHANGED CONDITIONS 
                                                 
335 Compare Amy Howe, Court Rules (Narrowly) for Baker in Same-Sex-
Wedding-Cake Case, SCOTUS Blog (Jun. 4, 2018), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-analysis-court-rules-narrowly-for-
baker-in-same-sex-wedding-cake-case/, with Douglas Laycock & Thomas Berg, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop—Not as Narrow as May First Appear, SCOTUS Blog 
(Jun. 5, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-masterpiece-
cakeshop-not-as-narrow-as-may-first-appear/.  
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 As the Court’s reversal of Craig and Mullins’ CADA 
discrimination claim has perhaps showed, so long as the kind of 
sexual minorities seeking remedial protection under anti-
discrimination laws seem to pose a threat to the status quo, the 
interest to protect them is less aligned than when the litigants 
seemed more assimilated and respectable.  As a result, the status 
quo will be preserved if a solution to do so exists.  In Masterpiece, 
that solution involved prioritizing an already-existing aspect of 
the dominant status quo:  anti-gay religious belief.  As an 
instance of queer sacrifice, the Court used religious freedom to 
undo the substance of Craig and Mullins’ public accommodations 
claim of sexual orientation discrimination, while legitimizing 
Phillips’ right to refuse the couple’s wedding cake request because 
of his religious beliefs.  
 Masterpiece’s legal contours, of course, beg the question of 
how sexual orientation anti-discrimination claims at the Court 
might succeed in the future.  A few weeks after releasing the 
decision, Justice Kennedy, the swing vote and author of previous 
gay rights decisions, as well as the author of Masterpiece’s 
majority opinion here, retired from the Court’s membership.336  
With his retirement, the Court’s new composition tips ever more 
socially and politically conservative, and thus, more directionally 
challenged to recognizing the rights of sexual minorities.337  Even 
if anti-discrimination legislation that protects sexual identity 
were to pass federally, such as the proposed Equality Act,338 what 
would prevent the Court from denying an otherwise valid 
instance of sexual orientation discrimination if the interests of 
uphold such protection failed to converge with the interests of 
status quo protection?   Given what occurred in Masterpiece, what 
                                                 
336 Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 27, 2018),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthony-kennedy-retire-
supreme-court.html. 
337 Adam Liptak, Confirming Kavanaugh: A Triumph for Conservatives, but a 
Blow to the Court’s Image, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/conservative-supreme-court-
kavanaugh.html.  
338 Jacob Ogles, Pelosi Prioritizing LGBTQ Equality Act as Speaker, ADVOCATE 
(Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.advocate.com/politics/2019/1/04/pelosi-prioritizing-
lgbtq-equality-act-speaker. 
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could prompt the Court not to commit other moments of queer 
sacrifice in future cases? 
 Conditions have veritably changed.  The Court is now a 
less gracious and promising venue for sexual minorities than 
when it decided the marriage cases.  But the problem of strategy 
for true equality should not have been exclusively hinged on the 
legal forum.339  Assimilationist strategies based on changing 
organizational practices in the gay movement that survived since 
AIDS epidemic campaigns have professionalized the face of gay 
rights lobbying and political organization.340  Some of the blame 
for the limitations in Masterpiece lies also within the narrower, 
single-issue approaches—such as marriage equality—that 
funneled gay rights into identity politics and a politics of 
respectability.  Unfortunately, respectability politics played into 
the dominance and power of the mainstream culture, rather than 
gaining equal footing with the mainstream.  Perhaps engaging 
within a politics of respect for all types of sexual identities, 
instead, would have avoided a more accommodating position 
against the mainstream. 
 Even worse, if Bell was correct in interpreting his own 
racial fortuity theory, then his observation stands that racial 
progress—and likely advancements for other marginalized 
groups—are “pre-ordained” by the back-and-forth process of 
interest convergence and involuntary sacrifice at the hands of the 
dominant power rather than considered as “hard-earned 
entitlement[s].”341  Placing this notion within the context of 
sexual orientation antidiscrimination, Bell’s remark here about 
the illusion of hard-earned entitlements in successes driven by 
interest convergence would even pierce or debunk the 
respectability politics that the Obergefell plaintiffs had courted 
with in order to obtain married equality.  One previous strand of 
conceptualizing Obergefell has focused on how same-sex couples 
there had earned their entitlement to marriage through their 
appearances of respectability—by how much their sameness 
                                                 
339 Bell, SILENT COVENANTS, supra n. __, at 185-86. 
340 Marie-Amélie George, The LGBT Disconnect: Politics and Perils of Legal 
Movement Formation, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 503, 535 (2018). 
341 Bell, SILENT COVENANTS, supra n. __, at 9. 
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dignified themselves enough for the Court to extend to them 
fundamental rights to marry, rather than by their showing of any 
intrinsic human worth or any inherent dignity.  However, if 
applying racial fortuity to explain gay rights advancements, then 
Bell would perhaps offer an even more cynical view than 
respectability politics.  His theory would deny the view of success 
in Obergefell as any hard-earned entitlement.  Rather, his theory 
of fortuity grafted here would conclude that equality for sexual 
minorities in Obergefell was driven by conditions beyond the 
control of sexual minority litigants themselves and that “[i]ts 
departure, when conditions change, is preordained,”342 as it did in 
Masterpiece.  In this view, Obergefell’s success was pre-ordained 
by changing conditions that provided sufficient interest 
convergence; it was not necessarily and solely earned through a 
showing of respectability.     
B.  MASTERPIECE’S MISSED FORTUITY 
Nevertheless, even if Bell’s theory about racial fortuity 
could be extended to comprehend the legal and political 
advancements for sexual minorities, this thesis ought not to stifle 
the movement, nor the aspirations for true equality.  Indeed, to 
combat the dilemma of racial fortuity, Bell responded with a 
strategy he called “forged fortuity.”343  Drawing on the view here 
that Masterpiece represents queer sacrifice and that the 
movement for advancing true equality for sexual minorities could 
be similarly understood within Bell’s racial fortuity thesis—
albeit, “queer fortuity” here—sexual minorities might benefit 
from Bell’s call to persist with forged fortuity, which he described 
as focusing less on the judiciary for results and “more on tactics, 
actions, and even attitudes that challenge the continuing 
assumptions of white dominance.”344  In particular, Bell had 
insisted that African-Americans “initiate and support actions that 
seemingly fly in the face of interest-convergence principles when 
those actions make life more bearable for blacks in a society 
where blacks are a permanent, subordinate class.”345  In such a 
                                                 
342 Id. 
343 See, e,g., id. at 190.  
344 Id. at 9. 
345 Id. at 190. 
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way, “[r]ecognition of our true state will serve as a gateway to an 
era where we forge fortuity, that is defy the workings of the 
involuntary sacrifices and interest-convergence determinants of 
racial policies and practices.”346  Bell’s examples of forged fortuity 
included the lunch counter sit-in protests by African-Americans 
that allowed them to “overcome traditional laws of trespass and 
breach of the peace” and prompted leaders of such protests “to 
think and plan within a context of ‘what is’ (the existing problem) 
rather than simply rely on the abstract concept of equality.”347  
For Bell, the crux of these sit-in protests for explaining forged 
fortuity strategies was “that a great many whites would not 
maintain discriminatory policies if the cost was too high.”348  
Likewise, Bell’s example of the strategies employed by William 
Robert Ming, a lawyer defending Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in a 
state income tax fraud claim, also displayed forged fortuity tactics 
that “articulate[d] racially realistic positions that touch some 
whites in the pocketbook, [and expected] that their sense of 
justice [would] follow.”349  In the suit that charged King with 
evading taxes by not reporting the funds retained by his Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference as his own taxable income, 
Ming defended Dr. King by boosting the number of businessmen 
in his all-white jury so that he could effectively win the case by 
convincing them that to find against Dr. King, they would be 
establishing a new precedent that would permit Alabama to 
“calculated your income taxes based on the total monies you have 
in your checking accounts.”350  Thus, Ming changed the conditions 
and forged fortuity by showing how costly it would be for whites 
to discriminate against Dr. King.  In some ways, one could 
recapitulate that forged fortuity represents action by a 
marginalized group to maximize self-interest in a way that 
harnesses the group’s power (rather than playing into the 
dominant authority) to drive forth common interests between the 
marginalized and dominant groups for producing meaningful, 
even transformative, change. 
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 By interpreting major gay rights cases, such as Obergefell 
and Masterpiece, through an extension of Bell’s theories, we 
receive insight about how such successes and defeats gained and 
suffered by sexual minorities are actually still predicated within 
the status quo, rather than actual victories that transform the 
status quo.  Thus, in hindsight, perhaps Craig and Mullins might 
have benefitted from legal arguments that had a larger focus on 
forging fortuity, rather than relying predominately on 
persuasions based within constitutional doctrine. Like the lunch 
counter sit-ins or William Robert Ming’s defense of Dr. King, 
Craig and Mullins might have raised reasons why sustaining 
discrimination against sexual minorities might not be 
economically viable for those controlling the status quo—not to 
say that this line of reasoning would have categorically altered 
Masterpiece’s course, but it perhaps would have played into 
neoliberal sensibilities of the Supreme Court Justices without 
affecting respectability politics.351  On below, the Colorado Court 
of Appeals had raised the economics issue, by noting that sexual 
orientation discrimination in public places incur “measurable 
adverse economic effects.”352  The Court of Appeals had even 
referenced a Michigan study that discussed how discriminatory 
business practices against sexual minorities had negative 
economic impacts on employers and for business profits state-
wide.353  On appeal to the Supreme Court in Masterpiece, the 
petitioner’s brief by Phillips’ attorneys unilaterally contested this 
point, downplaying the Court of Appeals’ analysis.354  But neither 
the Commission’s nor Craig and Mullins’ respondents’ briefs 
meaningfully addressed the economics of sexual orientation 
discrimination to combat the denial in Phillips’ petitioner’s 
brief.355  Rather, the economic impact of the sexual orientation 
discrimination was only left for prominent debate for amici—
                                                 
351 David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and 
Neoliberalism, 2014 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 13 (2014). 
352 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d at 293. 
353 Id. (referencing MICH. DEP’T OF CIV. RIGHTS, REPORT ON LGBT INCLUSION 
UNDER MICHIGAN LAW WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 74-90 (Jan. 28, 
2013), http://perma.cc/Q6UL-L3JR.    
354 Brief for Petitioner at 51, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
355 See Brief for Respondents at 9, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(No. 16-111).   
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between legal scholars who philosophically adhered to law and 
economics principles and filed their brief for Phillips’ side,356 and 
scholars who adhered to law and behavioral economics studies 
and wrote to undermine Phillips’ position and to debunk the 
certainty of law and economics arguments.357           
C.  FORGING FORTUITY THROUGH COALITION BUILDING 
Following Bell’s theory, others, in the context of race, have 
articulated multiracial coalition-building as an important general 
strategy for forging fortuity.358  “Interest,” as Sheryll Cashin 
perceives in her study of Bell’s thesis, “is the recognized tactical 
or strategic advantage that one racial group can gain by forming 
a coalition with another group.”359  In this sense, she remarks 
that “[t]here is a hopeful upside to Bell’s interest-convergence 
thesis:  broad coalitions for progressive social change are 
theoretically possible when common interests, or a convergence of 
enlightened self-interest, can be established.”360  Cashin’s 
examples of such coalition-building that transcends interest-
convergence principles include “coalitions among Asians, Latinos, 
and blacks [that] tend to be quite strong when formed around 
issues that all three groups benefit from, such as eliminating 
poverty or unemployment or discrimination.”361  Patience 
Crowder concurs with Cashin in her recent articulation of Bell’s 
interest convergence thesis from a transactional perspective:  
“[W]ithout significant coalition building among all relevant 
interest groups concerned about a particular issue, the 
unalignment of interests cannot only undo the outcome that 
resulted from a convergence of those interests but can actually 
abrogate any progress made during the period of convergence.”362  
                                                 
356 See Brief Amici Curiae of Law and Economics Scholars, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).   
357 See Brief Amici Curiae of Scholars of Behavior Science and Economics, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111). 
358 Bergin, supra n. __, at 302. 
359 Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and 
Ideology Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253, 278 (2005). 
 278. 
360 Id. at 276. 
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In Catherine Smith’s work on “outsider” interest convergence, 
Smith augments Cashin’s coalition-building idea by adding that 
within large coalitions, “members of subordinated groups go even 
further and identify how what are perceived to be white middle 
class, heterosexual norms and the subordinated groups’ 
respective group’s failures to conform to those norms serve to 
marginalize each group and all groups in the coalition.”363  Doing 
so “may also reveal how we each, even as members of 
subordinated groups, play a role in perpetuating the status 
quo”364 and how to respond to it collectively with action.365 
Of course, one danger of coalitions amongst different racial 
demographics, as Cashin admits, is how such multiracial coalition 
building might break down when specific intra-group ideologies or 
antagonism interfere with the cohesion of converging self-
interests.366  The hurdle of multiracial coalitions is for finding “a 
common interest that is significant enough to overcome any 
ideological differences.”367  Scott Cummings responds with two 
different takes on overcoming this hurdle.  First, he mentions 
Reva Siegel’s view that “it is the power of countermobilization in 
politics . . . that causes social movements to reframe their claims 
in terms that can attract widespread mainstream support.”368  
Secondly, Cummings also restates Gerald Torres’ perspective that 
“movements can succeed in shifting cultural norms in progressive 
directions so long as ‘non-elite actors have . . . a voice earlier in 
the agenda setting process’ thus ensuring the adequacy of their 
representation.”369  Both views give a less worrisome take on the 
political differences with large multiracial coalitions.   
In the advancement for true equality for sexual minorities, 
Bell’s forged fortuity strategies could help combat the cycle of 
interest convergence and queer sacrifice that continue to 
                                                 
363 Catherine Smith, Unconscious Bias and "Outsider" Interest Convergence, 40 
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364 Id. at 1090. 
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367 Id. at 282. 
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subordinate sexual minorities.  Given the complexities between 
racial and queer subordinations, some differences in forging 
fortuities in the context of race versus sexuality might occur.  
However, some commentators within the sexual minority 
movement have also noted the need for better coalition building 
that shifts the movement away from the professionalized, single-
issue, identity politics organizing of recent decades.  Through 
coalitions, Bell’s theory might bring the movement back to 
liberationist roots and view change not just in terms of formal 
equality but in terms of transforming the current world—i.e. that 
discriminatory status quo.  In line with views about coalition-
building for the sexual minority movement, some prominent 
LGBTQ voices have posited similarly.  Political science scholar 
Craig Rimmerman notes that “[a] central goal of radical 
democratic politics is to build permanent coalitions around 
political strategies and concrete public policies that cut across 
race, class, and gender divides, coalitions that will be ready to 
respond to the Christian Right’s distortions in all political 
arenas.”370  Historian Martin Duberman writes that in the 
advancement of sexual minorities the imperative for coalition 
building exists.  Especially in the post-Obergefell, post-Obama 
era, there might be a current spirit for “resistance” but “the parts 
do not cohere, and may never—not without a seismic effort to 
overcome our penchant for single-issue politics that caters solely 
to our own primary concerns.”371  He urges further “we must 
combine with allies who we don’t love but who share with us a 
common enemy—the country’s oligarchic structure, its 
patriarchal author, and its primitively fundamentalist moral 
values.”372 
In the short years before Obergefell, queer activist Urvashi 
Vaid wrote that mainstream gay rights organizations’ 
assimilative approaches have reduced the movement’s goals.373  
In part, this result is so because of the narrow vision of equality 
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that resonates only with the powerful factions of the mainstream 
gay movement and causes the movement to conceptualize 
changes within the framework of equality that are set ultimately 
by the dominant status quo.374   This notion might add to the 
reasons for explaining why the Obergefell and Masterpiece cases 
resulted the way they did, and how they extend Bell’s interest-
convergence and sacrifice thesis into gay rights, showing that 
progress is always “pre-ordained” by the dominant powers at 
play.  Recognition of sexual identity is not the same as allowing 
sexual minorities the ability to also live full lives.375  The goal is 
not just true equality, but human flourishing.  Change must 
affect the status quo in a way that transforms current hegemonic 
ideas about sexual minorities and result in a redistribution of 
justice.376 To that end, Vaid writes that   
[w]ithout a more substantive definition of equality, 
without a commitment to its extension to all LGBT 
people, without deeper and more honest appraisals 
of the limits of the traditions to which LGBT people 
seek admission, without a willingness to risk gains 
made for the opportunity to create a world that truly 
affirms the intrinsic moral and human worth of 
people’s sexual, racial, and gender difference, the 
LGBT politics currently pursued will yield only 
conditional equality, a simulation of freedom 
contingent on “good behavior.”377  
To displace this continuing phenomenon, she proposes a “justice-
based movement” as a type of “re-formed LGBT movement 
focused on social justice.”378  It would be committed to recognizing 
the different racial and economic demographics of sexual 
minorities379 and expanding a definition of equality that is more 
comprehensive.380  Such a movement would broaden the missions 
of major LGBT organizations, make them more inclusive and 
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379 Id. at 20-21.  
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democratic in participation and representation, and force 
restructure of their donor schemes that promote assimilationist 
strategies.381  To echo Bell about the over-reliance on the 
judiciary,382 Vaid suggests  
[s]hifting the arenas where we concentrate—from 
courts to executive and administration agencies, for 
example—and then also shifting how we consider the 
goal of our work there, from mere recognition or 
naming in a regulatory scheme to a consideration of 
how it does or does not help the lives and life 
chances of our communities, offers a practical path 
forward.383   
Lastly, for such a movement to flourish, “we will have to join with 
straight allies and create a new powerful electoral majority in 
this country.”384  Here, Vaid arrives at her concept of coalition-
building for sexual minorities.  Specifically, she mentions that 
“[f]or many decades, progressives have talked about the need to 
link up with each other beyond identity, around shared values 
and goals.”385  Thus, instead of working in political silos, “[w]e 
who have been working for LGBT liberation certainly do not see 
our goal as building a gay silo or living in one.”386  Those moves 
would be assimilative.  Rather “[w]e see our work instead as 
building common ground.”387  Vaid’s conception of coalition-
building is broad, philosophical, and liberationist, compared to 
the assimilative methods of lobbying by current mainstream gay 
rights organizations.  It also approaches Cashin, Crowder, and 
Smith’s extensions of Bell’s forged fortuity. 
 Reaching back to Bell’s iterations of forged fortuity, like 
white dominance, sexual minorities must presume 
heterosupremacy at play in everyday ordinary life.388  Because of 
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that supremacy, queer people are often undermined or 
subordinated—whether they are planning to get married, 
applying for a job, renting an apartment, or shopping for a cake.  
Understanding this perspective, sexual minorities ought to be 
subversive and work actively to protect self-interest but also not 
eager to sell out just to gain access to the dominant status quo.389  
Through inter- and intra-group interest convergence, coalitions 
must be formed with other marginalized people; and they must 
exist and protest collectively in ways that resemble in spirit the 
lunch counter sit-ins that Bell mentioned—against the dominant 
status quo as the cost and expense for reinforcing discriminatory 
beliefs and practices.  The larger and more robust the coalitions 
are, the less advantageous it would be in the dominant group’s 
interest to sustain discrimination.  Together with other groups, 
sexual minorities ought to able to create change that is lasting, 
transformative, and indeed liberationist. 
 Scholarly calls for coalition building echo each other.  On 
more liberationist terms, all of these calls could be workable as 
examples of forging fortuity.  Within the racial context, the 
scholarly observations for coalition building with common 
interests externalize Bell’s forged fortuity.  Brought into the 
sexual minority context, the call for broad coalition building—
particularly one that appears more transformative—echoes the 
need not only to combat a continuing inequality imposed against 
sexual minorities by those operating within a discriminatory 
status quo, but also the need to resolve the intra-group 
marginalization between assimilated, elite gays and lesbians and 
sexual minorities living outside that sub-category.390    These 
overlapping calls and suggestions for coalition building are more 
liberationist than assimilative.  Because such coalition building 
would hopefully seek to challenge the hegemony and not play into 
it, in that sense, a reformed movement that forges its own fortuity 
by coalescing around values and issues beyond identity politics 
should be broad and should earnestly be investigated as the next 
step forward. 391  It invariably ought to dial the LGBTQ 
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movement’s approaches and tactics back a few degrees 
liberationist and some significant degrees more queer. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Sexual minorities still live at the mercy of the dominant 
status quo.  By conceptualizing Masterpiece as an example of 
queer sacrifice and seeing how Bell’s theory of fortuity fits 
appropriately over the progressive ebb and flow of the sexual 
minority movement, it is possible to perceive that the movement 
needs to forge its own fortuity in order to further 
antidiscrimination efforts and effectively reach toward the state 
of true equality and human flourishing.  To that end, coalition 
building that focuses on common values and interests rather than 
identity politics might be the solution to press upon upending the 
dominant status quo.  And within such coalitions, liberationist 
approaches might need to guide the movement to advance more 
collectively and transformatively.   
